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The Courts uniformly give credit to the result of an election which has been
,declared by a legally constituted canvassing board, until such result is set aside
by a tribunal having jurisdiction to try and determine the right to the office in

contest.
The Act of Congress, and the Constitution and Ordinances of the Constitutional
Convention of Montana, declare exclusively who shall canvass the votes at the
election for the approval of the Constitution and the choice of the first State
officials.
An ordinance of a Constitutional Convention is a convenient method of separating temporary provisions from the body of the proposed Constitution; the force of
Such ordinance is the same as that of the proposed Constitution itself.
A member of the legislative assembly of Montana, whose compensation is fixed
by law, is entitled to have the same audited and settled, upon proving his mileage
and number of days of attendance; and the courts will enforce this fight by mandamus.

This was a mandamus proceeding in this Court and the
facts are fully stated in the opinion.
Fbert D. Weed, l1TcCutclzon &. ivclnture, and S. A. Balliet,
.J. Haskell, Attorney General, for the
for relator; Hon.
respondent.
HARWOOD, A. J., January 28, 189o. This action was commenced in this Court on the 17th day of January, A. D. 189o,
by filing the relator's affidavit, upon which he prayed for the
issuance of a writ of mandate directed to Edwin A. Kenney,
auditor of the State of Montana, commanding him to forthwith
audit and settle and issue relator a certificate for a certain
alleged claim in favor of relator against the State of Montana
in the sum of $339 for mileage and per diem for attendance as
a member of the House of Representatives of the legislative
assembly of the State of Montana.
The affidavit of the relator recites the following facts:
That affiant, William Thompson, is over 25 years of age, now is and has been
for more than twenty-five years last past a resident of the Territory and State of
Montana, and for three years last past has been a resident of the County of Silver
Bow, the said County being one of the representative districts of the State of
Montana. That, at the election held in the Territory of Montana on the first
Tuesday of October, A. D., 1889, under the provisions of an Act of Congress
,entitled "An Act to provide for the division of Dakota into two States, and to
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enable the people of North Dakota and South Dakota, Montana and Washington
to form State Constitutions and State Governments, and be admitted ino the
Union on an equal footing with the original States, and to make donations of publjc
lands to such States," approved February 22, ISS9; and as further provided for
by the Constitution, Ordinances and Schedule framed by the Constitutional Convention for the State of Montana, and adopte,1 by the people thereof, the relator,
William Thompson, was a candidate for election to the office of Representative in
the Legislative Assembly of the State of Montana from said representative district,
composed of the County of Silver Bow. That relator was voted for at said election, and was elected to the office of representative from said district. That the
returns of said election were made by the various judges of election in said district
to the clerk of said Silver Bow County, and that fifteen days thereafter the Chairman of the Board of County Commissioners of said Silver Bow County taking to
his assistance two officers of said County, canvassed the returns of said election,
and declared the result thereof so far as county officers were concerned, and that
so far as the members of the Legislative Assembly were concerned, the returns of
said election were made to the Secretary of the Territory of Montana. That thirty
days after said election, all votes for the members of the Legislative Assembly were
canvassed by the Governor, ChiefJustice, and Secretary of the Territory of Montana,
who then and there found, ascertained, declared, and certified that the affiant,WVilliam
Thompson, was duly elected to the House of Representatives of the Legislative
Assembly of Montana, as a member thereof, and that the said Governor and
Secretary of the Territory of Montana, did deliver to affiant a certificate over their
hands and seal of said Territory, certifying and declaring that at such election
aforesaid affiant bad been elected a member of the House of Representatives of
the said Legislative Assembly.
That on the 23rd day of November, A. D., 1889, at 12 o'clock, noon, pursuant
to the proclamation of the Governor of Montana, the Legislative Assembly of said
State was convened and affiant appeared at the Capital of the State at that time,
and in conjunction with twenty-nine other persons, who had, as aforesaid, been
ascertained, declared and certified by the aforesaid canvassing board, composed of
the Governor, Secretary and Chief Justice of the Territory of Montana, to have
been elected from the various representative districts in said State, did meet as the
House of Representatives of the State of Montana, at the Capital of said State, and
in the place by them and the Auditor of said State agreed upon, of which place of
meeting previous public notice had been given. That then and there, in a room
provided for the purpose, the relator and said twenty-nine other persons convened
and were called to order by the Auditor of the State of Montana, and thereupon
the thirty members proceeded to qualify and organize the house of Representatives of the Legislative Assembly of tle State of Montana, by the election of Aaron
C. Witter, one of said members, as Speaker of the House of Representatives, and
Benjamin Webster as Chief Clerk thereof. That such proceedings were then and
there had by the members of the House, as that a committee thereof was
appointed on credentials, to which committee the said thirty members presented
severally a certificate signed by the Governor and Secretary of Montana, and over
the seal of the Territory of Montana, certifying and declaring that each of them
had been duly elected members of the House of Representatives of the Legislative
Assembly of the State of Montana. That said committee on credentials then and
there reported to the said House that the said thirty members aforesaid, including
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affiant, were duly elected members of the House of Representatives of the Legislative Assembly of the State of Montana, and entitled to seats thereiU, which said
report was approved and adopted by the said House.
That, thereafter, the said House continued to sit from day to day, from that date,
to wit: November 23rd, A. D. 1889, to the date of the signing of affiant's affio
davit, to wit: January 16th, A. D., i89 , and that affiant has attended said sessions, from that time until the time of making this affidavit, as a member of said
House of Representatives, except on the 1 3 th day of January, A. D , 189o.
That affiant travelled the distance of seventy-five miles in going by the nearest
usually travelled route, from his residence to the capital of said State to attend
said Legislative Assembly. That, on the 23rd day of November, A.D., iSS9, the
affiant and all the said twenty-nine members, took the oath prescribed by the Constitution of thd State of Montana as members of the Legislative Assembly of the
State of Montana, and that the said thirty members have attended upon the various
sessions of the said House.
That on the 16th day of January, A. D., I89o, affiant presented to Edwin A
Kenney, who was then the Auditor of the State of,Montana, at his office, an
account against the State for his services and attendance as a member of the House
aforesaid, at the rate of $6 per day, and mileage at the rate of 2o cents per mile
for the distance travelled as aforesaid, as provided by law, and requested the said
Auditor to audit and settle the said claim and give affiant a certificate thereof; but
to audit and settle said claim or give affiant a certificate thereof, or any part thereof,
the said Auditor did then and there refuse, nor would the said Auditor approve
such claim, or any part thereof.

To which affidavit affiant attaches an account as "Exhibit
A," which he verifies as a copy of the said account presented
to said Auditor and referred to in his affidavit.
Upon this showing, an alternative writ of mandate was
issued out of this court requiring the said Edwin A. K enney,
Auditor of the State of Montana, to forthwith audit and settle
said claim against the Treasury of the State of Montana, and
give to said William Thompson a certificate thereof, or to show
cause before this court at io o'clock a. m., January 2oth, A.D.,
I89O,why he had not done so.

To this process the respondent made his verified answer,
wherein he expressly admitted in detail all the affirmative
allegations set forth in the relator's affidavit. But in addition
to such express admissions, the respondent alleged other
matters, as follows:
"Defendant further says, that in the County of Silver Bow, which is a Representative District, ten persons were apportioned to be elected members of the
House of Representatives. That as to the election of five of said persons, no controversy has arisen, but as to the said relator and four of his colleagues, sitting
VOL. XXXVIII.-15.
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with him in the House aforesaid, a controversy as to their election has arisen, and
unless they areprimaazciemembers of such House and entitled to act therein, no
quorum has been present in said House, and the organization thereof has been
without legislative authority. That the House is composed of thirty members,
whose muniment of title is the ascertainment, declaration and certificate of the
Canvassing Board, consisting of the Governor, Chief Justice and Secretary of the
Territory of Montana, as provided in ordinance number two, passed by the Constitutional Convention of the State of Montana. That on the 23rd day of Iovember, A. D., 1889, twenty-four persons from various representative districts in the
State of Montana, who had been ascertained and declared to have been elected
members of said House of Representatives, by the Governor, Chief Justice and
Secretary aforesaid, under said Ordinance of the Constitution, did meet at another
place in the capital of said State, and five members from the County of Silver Bow,
one of whom assumed to have been elected in lieu of relator, met with said members last aforesaid, and having been declared not elected by the said Canvassing
Board, provided for in said ordinance, did, nevertheless, assume to be members of
the House of Representatives, and did then and there present as their muniment
of title to said office, each a certificate signed by the County Clerk and Recorder
of Silver Bow County, over his seal, certifying and declaring that such person was
elected one of the Representatives of the district of Silver Bow County, as Representative in said House."

To the foregoing new matter set forth by respondent, the
relator filed his replication, as follows:
First. The relator "denies that any controversy has arisen as to his election,
and the election of four of his colleagues from the County of Silver Bow, as set
forth in said answer.
Second. Avers that at the times the said House was organized, and when said
House passed upon the report of the Committee on Credentials, as set forth in
relator's application, a quorum of said House was present and acted therein."

The parties rested their case upon the allegations, admissions and denials in the pleadings above set forth, and upon
the questions raised therein, the case was argued and submitted to the court for decision.
At the commencement of the consideration of the questions
involved herein it is proper to notice the scope and effect of
the relator's replication. He denies therein "that any controversy has arisen as to his election, and the election of four
of his colleagues ;" but he does not deny the further facts set
out in respondent's answer. These specific facts alleged, stand
unchallenged, and were urged upon the consideration of the
court as ground for the refusal, on the part of the respondent,
to audit and settle relator's claim, and to grant him a certificate thereof, as provided by law.
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The relator relied upon the facts alleged in his affidavit, expressly admitted by respondent's answer, as grounds for the
relief which he prayed for.
The effect of these pleadings raised questions of law only.
No issues of fact were made upon which evidence could properly be introduced. The denial made by the relator's replication was nothing more than a denial of an immaterial allegation.
Compiled Statutes of Montana, Section 575 of the code of
civil procedure, relating to the cases of mandamus, provides

as follows:
"If no answer be made, the case must be heard on the papers of the applicant.
If the answer raises only questions of law, or puts in issue immaterial statements,
not affecting the substantial rights of the parties, the court must proceed. to hear, or
fix aday for hearing the argument of the case."

This court is given original jurisdiction to hear and determine actions of this character by section 3, article 8, of the constitution of Montana, as follows:
"The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to all cases at
law and in equity, subject, however, to such limitations and regulations as may be
prescribed by law. Said Court shall have power, in its discretion, to issue and
hear and determine writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo-warranto, certiorari,
prohibition and injunction, and such other original and remedial writs as may be
necessary and proper to the complete exercise of its appellate jurisdiction."

In reference to the office of the writ of mandamus, the

Compiled Statutes of Montana, sections 566 and 567, of Code
of Civil Procedure provide as follows:
Sec. 566. It may be issued by any court in this State, except justice's, probate
and mayor's court, to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person, to compel
the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust, or station, or to compel the admission of a party to the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled, and from which he is unlawfully precluded by such inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person.
Sec. 567. The writ shall be issued in all cases where there is not a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It shall be issued,
upon affidavit, on the application of the party beneficially interested.

It must now be determined whether, or not, the act, the
performance of which is here sought to be compelled, is one

which the law especially enjoins upon the respondent as a
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duty resulting from his office as Auditor of this State.
involves two propositions:

This

First. Is the relator entitled, upon the facts shown, to have
his claim audited and settled, and to receive a certificate
thereof?
Second. Does the law enjoin upon the state auditor the
duty of auditing and settling said claim, and issuing to relator
a certificate thereof ?
These propositions will be considered in the order stated.
To the high office of legislator, and to persons occupying
that office, the law guarantees certain rights, privileges and
emoluments, which courts of justice will regard and enforce in
proper cases and upon proper showing: Constitution of Montana, Art. 5, Sections 5, 15 ; I Blackstone, 164 and notes and
cases cited ; Cushing Leg. Assemblies, Sections 546 to 957 ;
Cooley's Cont. Lim., 16z, 163; Jefferson's Manual; i Kent's
Com. 235.
But in passing upon a question of this character, relating
to a person claiming to be a member of the legislative
Assembly of the State, this Court is mindful of the constitutional provision which places the power to try the ultimate
right to the office, in another forum, i. e., in the legislative
house wherein the person claims a seat: Constitution of Montana, Art. 5, Sec. 9.
That body, and that alone, having the plenary jurisdiction
to try the ultimate right to the office, it must be determined
in the case at bar, on what character of primnafacie evidence
will courts ofjustice enforce collateral or incidental rights and
privileges belonging to the members of the legislative Assembly. In other words, as applicable to this case at bar, what
constitutes in the view of the courts of justice sufficient prima
facie evidence of his membership in the "House of Represenatives of this State to entitle the relator to the relief which he
asks, that is, to have his claim to the emoluments of the office
of representative from Silver Bow County, audited, settled and
certified.
Under our republican form of Government election to this
office is made by the votes of the legally qualified electors of
the district in the manner prescribed by law, and the result of
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such election is ascertained in the manner prescribed by
law through the returns and canvass of such votes by legally
constituted canvassing boards.
The courts have uniformly given credit to the result of an
election, as ascertained and declared or certified by the legally
constituted canvassing board to whom the law has committed
the duty of canvassing the returns of the election, and declaring the result until this evidence of the election has been
overborne by the trial and determination of the ultimate right
to such office by the tribunal having jurisdiction to try and determine the same: Crowell v. Lambert(1865), io Minn. 369;
State v. Clurchill (1870), 15 Id. 455 ; State v. Sherwood (1870),
15 Id. 221 ; People v. l.Ailler(1867), 16 Mich. 56 ; Swinborn v.
Smith et al. (1879), 15 W. Va. 483; Hitisman v. Rems (1861),
41 Penn. 396; Kerrv. Tiege (1864),47 Id. 292; Commonwealth
v. Baxter (i86o), 35 Id. 263; DeArmond v. The State ex rel.
Cambell (1872), 4o Ind. 469; Hadley v. City of Albany
(1865), 33 N.Y. 603.
This is not only the rule governing the action of courts,
but it is the practice adopted in the organization of legislative bodies and admitting members thereto, until the prima
facie evidence contained in the certificate of election issued by
the legally constituted canvassing board is set aside by the
proper authority in the determination of a contested election :
Cush. Law and Practice of Leg. Assemb., Sections I41, 142
and 229 to 241, inclusivd. The authorities reviewed and cited
by this eminent author amply show the practice on this question: McCray on Elections, Sections 270 to 285, inclusive,
and cases cited; Jefferson's Manual (I 2th Ed.), 390.
In the case at bar, it is asserted, and not denied, that another
person holds a certificate of election to the same office which
the relator claims to be occupying, issued by the County Clerk
of Silver Bow County. It therefore becomes necessary, in
the determination of this case, to ascertain what board, or person, is by law authorized to canvass the returns of the election
in question, and ascertain and certify the result, so as to entitle the person holding that muniment of title to the office,
primafacie,to maintain his case in an action of this character.
If the right of relator to the certificate of election which he
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holds is challenged, let the question be raised and determined
in the proper form; but if the legislative body of which the
relator claims to be a member, vested as it is with the powers
which the Constitution of this State has committed to it, and
in view of the long line of precedents which have guided the
actions of such bodies in like cases, doe8 not determine a controversy as to the election of the relator, then in the nature of
the case there exists no better evidence of his right to relief
than the finding or certificate of the legally constituted canvassing board charged with the duty of ascertaining the result of
the election in question. The title to an elective office, in a
majority of cases, rests on this primafacie evidence, because
in the great majority of cases there is no adjudication of the
right to the office which inquires back of the returns of the
proper canvassing board. It is proper to observe here that
under well established rules of law, if it was shown that a
contest of the election of the relator was pending in the House
of which he claims to be a member, and to which he holds a.
certificate of election, then this Court would withhold judgment until the case was determined, but no such fact appears.
The relator's certificate of election emanates from a canvassing board composed of the Governor, Chief Justice and Secretary. The other certificate, which is set up in opposition to
this, is held by another person, emanates from the County
Clerk of Silver Bow County, accredited under the hand and
official seal of that officer; and this is not denied by the
relator.
In the absence of any mention of this latter certificate, the
consideration of this case necessarily involves the question as
to whether the relator's certificate of election issues from the
legally constituted Canvassing Board, charged with the duty
of ascertaining, from the returns, the election of members of
the House of Represenatives. The primatfacie right to relief
rests upon the credentials, with the facts of service.
The act of Congress above mentioned, enabling the people
of Montana and other Territories to form and adopt constitutions and set up state governments, provides in Sec. 8, as
follows:
,, At the electons provided for in this section, the qualified voters of said pro-
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posed States shall vote directly for or against the proposed Constitution, and for
or against any arzicles or propositions separately submitted. The returns of such
election shall be made to the Secretary of each of the said Territories, who, with
the Governor and Chief Justice thereof, or any two of them, shall canvass the
same."

Section 9 of the same Act provides as follows" That until the next census, or until otherwise provided by law, said States
shall be entitled to one Representative in the House of Representatives of the
United States, except South Dakota, which shall be entitled to two; and the Representatives to the Fifty-first Congress, together with the Governors and other
State officers provided for in said Constitutions, may be elected on the same day
of the election for the ratification or rejection of the Constitutions; and until said
State officers are elected and qualified under the provisions of each Constitution,
and the States respectively are admitted into the Union, the Territorial officers
shall continue to discharge the duties of their respective offices in each of said
Territories."

Section

24

of the same Act provides as follows-

"That the Constitutional Convention may, by ordinance, provide for the election of officers for full State Governments, including members of the Legislature

and Representatives in the Fifty-first Congress; but said State Governments shall
remain in abeyance until the State shall be admitted into the Union respectively,
as provided in this Act. In case the Constitutions of any of said proposed States
shall be rectified by the people, but not otherwise, the Legislature thereof may
assemble, organize and elect two Senators of the United States; and the Governor and Secretary of State of such proposed States shall certify the election of
the Senators and Representatives in the manner required by law, and when such
State is admitted into the Union, the Senators and Representatives shall be enabled to be admitted to seats in Congress, and to all the r'ghts and privileges of
Senators and Representatives of other States in the Congress of the United States;
and the officers of the State Governments formed in pursuance of said Consitution, as provided by the Constitutional Convention, shall proceed to exercise all
the functions of such State officers; and all laws in force made by said Territo-ies
at the time of their admission into the Union, shall I-e in force in said States, except as modified or changed by this Act, or by the Constitutions of the States
respetively."

Section

25

of the same Act provides.as follows-

"That all Acts or parts of Acts in conflict with the provisions of this Act,
whether passed Ly the Legisiatures of said Tirritories or by Congress, are hereby
repealed."

Having reviewed these provisions of the enabling Act of
Congress, we will proceed to the Constitution of Montana,
and consider its provisions upon this subject.
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"Schedule," section I, provides as follows"The laws enacted by the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Montana,
and in force at the time the State shall be admitted into the Union, and not inconsistent with this Constitution, or the Constitution or Laws of the United States of
America, shall be and remain in full force as the Laws of the State, until altered
or repealed, or until they expire by their own limitations."

Section 17 of the schedule provides as follows"All Territorial, county and township officers now occupying their respective
positions under the laws of the Territory of Montana, or of the United States of
America, shall continue and remain in their respective official positiuns and perform the duties thereof as now provided by law, after the State is admitted into
the Union, and shall be considered state officers until their successors in office
shall be duly elected and qualified, as provided by ordinance, notwithstanding any
inconsistent provisions in this Constitution, and shall Le entitled to the same compensation for their servizes as is now established by law; provided that the compensation of Justices of the Supreme Court, Governor and Secretary of the
Territory, shall be paid by the State of Montana."

Passing to ordinance number two, referred to in the last
section, ordained and promulgated by the Constitutional Convention, with the Constitution of the State, and adopted by
the people, we find provisions as follows"First. That an election shall be held throughout the Territory of Montana on
the first Tuesday of October, A. D. i889, for the ratification or rejection of the
Constitution framed and adopted by this Convention."
"Fifth. The votes cast at said e.ec:ion for the adoption or rejection of said
Constitution shall be convassed by the Canvassing Boards of the respective Counties not later than fifteen days after said election, or sooner if the returns from all
the precincts shall have been received, and in the manner prescribed by the laws
of the Territory of Montana for canvassing the votes at the general elections in
said Territory. And the ie:urns of said election shall be made to the Secretary
of the Territory, who, wi:h the Governor and the Chief Justice of the Territory,
or any two of them, shall constitute a B ard of Canvassers, who shall meet at the
office of the Secretary of the Terri:ory on or before the thirtieth day after the election and canvass the votes so cat and declare the result."
"Sixth. That on the first Tuesday in October, A. D. 1889, there shall be elected
by the qualified elec:ors of Montana, a Governor, a Lieutenant-Governor, a Secretary of State, an Attorney General, a State Auditor, a Superindendent of Public
Instruction, one Chief Justice and two Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, a
Judge for each Judicial DistrIct established by this Constitution, a Clerk of the
Supreme Court, and a Clerk of the District Court in and for each County of the
State, and the mem! ers of the Legislative Assembly provided for in, this Constitution. The terms of the officers so elected shall begin when the State shall be
admitted into the Union, and shall end on the first Monday in January, A. D.
1893, except as otherwise provided."
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"Seventh. There shall be elected at the same time, one Representative in the
Fifty-first Congress of the United States."
"]Eighth. The votes for the above officers shall be returned and canvassed as is
provided by law, mid returns shall be made to the Secretary of the Tetritory and
canvassed in the same manner, and by the same Board, as is the vote uron the
Constitution, except as to Clerk of the District Court."

It is clear that said Act of Congress, legislating for the people of the Territory of Montana, supplemented and carried
out by the Constitution and Ordinances framed and promulgated by the Constitutional Convention, and ratified by the
people of the Territory, covered the whole question as to
what Board should canvass the votes cast at the late election,
both for and against the Constitution, and for members of the
Legislative Assembly, and State and District officers, and declare the result.
The fifth paragraph of Ordinance two, above quoted requires that the returns of said election for the adoption or
rejection of the Constitution"Shnll be made to the Secretary of the Territory, who, with the Governor and
the Ch ef Justice of the Territo;y, or any two of them, shall constitute a Board of
Convasser-, who shall meet at the office of the Secretary of the Territory on or
before the thirtieth day after election, and canvass the votes so cast, and declare
the result."

The eighth paragraph of the same Ordinance provides"That the votes fo'r allthe State officers, members of the Legislative Assembly
and District Judges, shall be returned and canvassed in the same manner and by
the same Board as is the vote upon the Constitution."

It is contended by the respondent, that a statute of the
Territory of Montana, existing prior to the said Act of Congress, and prior to the adoption of the Constitution, provided,
contrary to the Act of Congress and the Constitution and Ordinances above quoted, in that this statute provides that the
canvass of the votes cast for members of the Legislative Assembly shall be made by the Boards of County Commissioners
of the respective Counties in the Territory, and certificates of
election shall be issued by the Clerk of the Board of County
Commissioners: Compiled Statutes, section 1033, page 930.
This position is untenable. There are no statutes of the
Territory of Montana brought. over and adopted by the peo-
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ple of this State, contrary or in conflict with the Constitution
thereof, for this plain reason: It 'is provided by the Act of
Congress above quoted, enabling the people of said Territory
to form a Constitution and State Government, that"All laws in force made by said territories at the time of their admission into,

the Union, shall be in force in said States, except as modified or changed by this
Act, or by the Constitutions of the States respectively." S. 24, st. ra.

This provision was further amplified by Section i of" Schedule," of th& Constitution of Montana, suprd. By these provisions the statute law of Montana Territory is remoulded at
once to join in harmony with the State Constitution.
An example of this modification or remoulding of the statute
law to harmonize with the Constitution, is found in reference
to the constitution of the grand jury. The express letter of
the statute in force at the time the State was admitted into the
Union, provided that this body should consist of sixteen persons in number, of whom twelve could find a "true bill."
The State Constitution provides that the grand jury shall consist of seven persons, of whom five are competent to find an
indictment. It has been abundantly provided, by the Act of
Congress and the. State Constitution, that the statute is in
force as modified by the Constitution, and it cannot be maintained, either as a logical or reasonable conclusion that there
is a conflict, where the latter, and paramount organic law, has
expressly adopted the former statute law, as modified by the
Constitution: State v. Ak Jim (decided in the Sup. Ct. Montana,
January 14, 1890).
Counsel for respondent, in this connection 'contends, that
the Ordinances framed by the Constitutional Convention, and
appended to the Constitution, were not a part of that instrument, and did not have the force and effect of constitutional
provisions. For this reason, the provisions of the ordinance
declaring that the Governor, Chief Justice and Secretary of
Montana, should constitute a Canvassing Board to canvass the
votes and declare the result of the election of members of the
Legislative Assembly, was impotent to work a change or
modification of the statute, providing that the certificates of
election of such members shall be issued by the County Clerk.
Hence that statute stands in full force, and the County Clerk's
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certificate is the best primafacie evidence of a party's right to
a seat in the Legislative Assembly.
No authorities have been brought to the attention of the
court to sustain the respondent's position in respect to Ordinances framed and promulgated by Constitutional conventions.
It appears this question was raised in the case of Stewart
v. Crosby (1855), 15 Texas, 546, wherein Justice WHEELER, in
passing upon this point, says:
,,
We think it free from doubt that the Ordinance appended to the Constitution
is a part of the fundamental law of the land. Having been framed by the Convention that framed the Constitution of the State, and adopted by the Convention
and the people, along with the Constitution, it is of equal authority and binding
force upon the executive, legislative and judicial departments of the government
of the State, as if it had been incorporated in the Constitution, forming a component part of it.'

The case cited appears to have involved questions of great
importance, as shown by the remarks of the judge at the commencement of the opinion, as follows:
"In the argument of this case, questions of great moment to the parties, involv.
ing an inquiry respecting the constitutionality of the legislative enactments, which
they have invoked, and on which they rely to maintain their claims, have beeti
discussed."

Mr. Paine, in his work on elections, section 294, announces
the same doctrine, as does the case of Stewart v. Crosby, supra,
in the following terms:
"Th launch a new constitution, certain machinery and arrangements are
always necessary, which having subserved this single purpose, are of no further
use. These might, of course, be provided in the constitution itself; but to incorporate temporary provisions into the body of a permanent constitution, would be to
encumber the instrument with matter which might more properly be excluded
from the text of the constitution, and placed in such a form as to be dropped
when all the uses for which it was provided, have been fully subserved. Accordingly, these provisions for inaugurating new state constitutions, usually take the
form of detached ordinances, or schedules. The validity and effect of these provisions are precisely the same, whether they are placed in the ordinance or schedule,
to be thrown aside when no longer needed, or imbedded in the text of the constitution, to remain a permanent blemish, after the accomplishment of all the purposes
for which they were required. It is clearly competent for a constitutional convention, by an ordinance or schedule, to change the time for holding the general
election of the state. * * * The people of the state in their constitutional
conventions are always their owfi masters. There is nothing to restrain them
from giving whatever form they prefer to its organic law, except the Constiution
of the United States and treaties made and laws enacted by the United States in
pursuance thereof."
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To declare that the County Clerk's certificate of election to
the office in question is the highest prima facie evidence of
title to the office, as against the certificate of the Canvassing
Board constituted by the act of congress, and the ordinance
framed by the constitutional convention and adopted by the
people, would be in effect to declare that the provisions of the
statute in this respect stand without modification by the Act
of Congress and Constitution and Ordinances, and prevail
over them. If the Ordinance did not work a change in the
statute, in this particular, how can it be maintained that the
same ordinance worked such important changes in other
respects? The effect of ordinance .Number Two was to determine the terms of all the elective officers of the Territory of
Montana, while under the literal statutory provisions, their
terms of office would have continued for more than a year.
And under that theory, the officers elected at the late election,
under this ordinance, who have taken possession of these
offices, are there without authority.
The logical analogies of this theory need not be further
traced. It destroys itself by its inherent fallacy, without the
force of the authorities above quoted to the contrary.
The Constitutional Convention was authorized, by Act of
Congress, to make provision, "by ordinance" for the election
of officers for full state government.
In the body of the constitution, at Section Seventeen of the
Schedule, the state officers to be " duly elected and qualified,
as provided by ordinance," are referred to. The Ordinance
was framed and adopted by the Convention, promulgated to
the people, and by them ratified.
The provisions of the Constitution and Ordinance, relating
to carrying out the election, to set in motion the state government, was intended for immediate execution within a short
time after the constitution was framed. The plain intent of
the convention when framing Ordinance Number Two is
shown in the provision dividing the state, legislative and district officers into one class, and directing that the returns of
the election of these officers should be made to the Secretary
of the Territory, and canvassed in the same manner and by
the same Board as the vote upon the Constitution. And in the
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"ninth" paragraph of that ordinance, the election of the county
and township officers was provided for. And the "tenth"
paragraph provides that the votes for the above county and
township officers, and for Clerk of the District Court, shall be
returned and canvassed as is 'now provided by law.
The effect of the Ordinance upon the statute is to change
and modify its provisions so far as is necessary to give the
provisions of the Ordinance full scope and effect.
It
follows that the relator's certificate of election emanates from
the legally constituted canvassing board and will be admitted
in this action as prznafade evidence of his election to the office in question.
The facts of attendance upon the sessions of the house, and
as to distance traveled are asserted by the affidavit of the
relator, and admitted by the verified answer of respondent.
No question has been raised upon these matters, set forth in
relator's affidavit.
The constitution of the state fixes the amount of compensation at $6 for each day's attendance and 2o cents per mile
for each mile necessarily traveled, by the nearest usually
traveled route in going to the seat of government from the
member's residence, and returning thereto. And the relator's
claim conforms to these prescribed rates.
It remains to be determined whether the law enjoins upon
the State Auditor the duty of auditing and settling said claim
and issuing to the relator a certificate thereof.
Section

121,

Fifth Div. Comp. Statutes, provides as follows:

•'He shall audit all claims against the treasury and when the law recognizes a.

claim, but no appropriation has been made therefor, shall settle the claim and
give the claimant a certificate thereof, and report the same to the legislative
assembly."
This provision of the statutes should be considered in connection with section 2o of article 7, of the State Constitution,
which provides as follows:
"Section 2o. The Governor, Secretary of State and Attorney General shall
constitute a Board of State Prison Commissioners, which Board shall have such
supervision of all matters connected with the state prisoners as may be prescribed
by law. They shall constitute a Board of Examiners with power to examine all
claims against the State, except salaries, or compensation of officers fixed by law,
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and perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law.

And no claim

against the State, except for salaries and compensation of officers fixed by law,

shall be passed upon by the Legislative Assembly without first having been
considered and acted upon by said board. '

The section of the statute above quoted provides that the
Auditor "shall audit all claims against the treasury, and when
the law recognizes the claim, but no appropriation has been
made therefor, shall settle the claim and give the claimant a
certificate thereof, and report the same to the legislative
assembly."
The Constitution has created a Board of Examiners, with power to examine all claims against the State,
except salaries or compensation of officers fixed by law, and
provides that " no claims against the state, except for salaries
and compensation of officers fixed by law, shall be passed
upon by the legislative assembly without first having been
considered and acted upon by said board."
The salaries or compensation of officers fixed by law, being
expressly in all cases excepted by the provisions of the Constitution, from the action of said Board of Examiners, the
duty of the State Auditor, under the statute, is clear as to
the relator's claims.
No other class of claim against the
State is presented in this action than the compensation of an
officer fixed by law. However, it is deemed proper to consider the statutory and constitutional provisions together, so
that no misapprehension will arise as to the decision herein.
The relator asks that his claim against the State for compensation for service as a member of the House of Representatives ofthe legislative assembly of this State, for the fiftyfour days attendance at the sessions of that body, together
with mileage for seventy-five miles traveled by the nearest
usually traveled route from his residence to that assembly, at
the rate fixed by law, amounting to $339, be audited and
settled, and that a certificate thereof be given him by the
,respondent, Edwin A. Kenney, Auditor of the State of Montana. Under the provisions of law and the showing in this
action, it is held by this court that the relator is entitled to
the relief prayed for; that the relief prayed for is a duty
specially enjoined upon the State Auditor as resulting from
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his office; that the writ of mandamus is the proper remedy
herein.
WHEREFORE, It is ordered that a peremptory writ of mandate be issued in the form provided by law, as prayed for in
relator's affidavit.
./oe.-Chief justice Blake having been a member of the Canvassing Board
mentioned in the above opinion, did not sit in the hearing and the determination
of this action.
from the Act of 1872, which provided
In Pennsylvania a new Constitution
was prepared by a Convention au- for the conduct of this election " as the
thorized to be held by an Act of As- general elections of this Commonwealth
sembly, approved April i, 1872 (P. are now by law conducted ;" (6.) consequently, an Ordinance of-the ConL. 53), and was adopted by a considvention could not contravene the law.
erable majority at an election held on
Wells v. Bain was followed by
the sixteenth of December, 1873.
Woods Afeal, decided November 2,
The Convention had provided Ly the
1874, and reported in the same volume
Schedule annexed to the proposed Con(75 Pa. 59). The Supreme Court afstitution, that Section r. "This Constitufirmed the cardinal doctrine that the
tion should take effect on the first day
Cpnvention had no absolute authority.
of January, in the year 1874, for all
"The people have the same right to
purposes not otherwise provided for
limit the powers of their delegates" to
therein." The Act of 1872 ( 6), proa constitutional convention, "that they
vided for the counting of the votes and
a proclamation of the result of the have to bound the power of their representatives" in the legislature.
election by the Governor; and if a
"The question is not upon the power
majority of the votes were polled for
of the legislature to restrain the tcotle,
the proposed Constitution, such new or
but upon the right of the people, by
revised Constitution should be thencethe instrumentality of-the law, to limit
forth, the Constitution of this Commontheir delegates. Law is the highest
wealth. The possible conflict between
form of a people's will in a state of
the Schedule and the Act of Assembly,
matured by the counting of the votes
peaceful government. When a people
act through a law, the act is theirs, and
on the sixth day of January, I874,
the fact that they used the legislature
and the proclamation of the Governor
as their instrument to confer their powon the seventh day of January, 1874.
ers, makes them the superiors, and not
This action was in accordance with a
decision ( Iells ei al., v. Bain et al., the legislature. The idea which lies at
the root of the fallacy, that a convention
December 6, 1873, 75 Pa. 39), upon an
application for an injunction from the
cannot be controlled by law, is that the
convention and the people are identical.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvani., to reBut when the question to be deterstrain the holding of the election of
December i6, 1873, so far as concerned
mined, is between the people and the
the City of Philadelphia, by special of- convention, the fallacy is obvious. *
* * No argument for the implied
ficers chosen by the Convention, in lieu
power of absolute sovereignty in a
of the regular election officers. The
convention can be drawn from revoluinjunction was granted upon the ground
tionary times, when necessity begets a
that the Convention derived its powers
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new government. Governments, thus
accepted and ratified by silent submis"sion, afford no precedents for the power
of a convention in a time of profound
tranquillity, and for a people living
under self-established, safe institutions:" AGNFw, C. J. pp. .71, 72, 73;
the same effect is the opinion of the
Justices, January 23, 1883, 6 Cushing
(Mass.) 573.
Notwithstanding these sentiments,
SHARSWOOD, J., in AXortlhanllton Co. v.
Lehigh C. &- .A. Co., decided May ii,
1874, and reported in the same volume (75 Pa. 461), incidently remarked
"the Constitution did not go into operation until Jahuary ist, 1874, Schedule,
See. i." This qftite agrees with ruling
in Texas: iinfra page 245.
This Pennsylvania incident is cited
as a strong method of distinguishing the
principal case in several particulars.
And, first, in the principal case, unlike
that in Pennsylvania, no question did
or should arise as to the power of the
convention to make an ordinance. Consequently a discussion of the powers of
a constitutional convention may be
omitted here, with the caution that the
language quoted on page 235 is entirely
too loose even for the purposes of the
principal case. Second, both in Pennsylvania and in Montana, schedules
were properly appended to the proposed
constitutional provisions; this will appear from a brief examination into the
functions and force of such temporary
additions.
The true function of a schedule or
ordinance accompanying a proposed
Constitution and submitted for the
approval of the voters at the same time,
came up for decision in Wattson v.
Chester& D. R. R. R. Co. (1877), 83
Pa. 253, 255. The Court, speaking
through Chief Justice AGNEW, said that
the Schedule to the Pennsylvania Con-

stitution of 1874 was "intended to
bridge over the chasm between the two
frames of government, and make the
transition, from one to the other, easy
and without unnatural disturbance of
the affairs of the people." To the same
effect are Sigur v. Crenshaw (1853),
8 La. Xn. 401, 422; citations ante
page 235; The Comm.ex rel. v. Collins (1839), 8 Watts. (Pa.,) 348, 336;
Plowman v. Thornton, (1875), 52 Ala.
559, 568. Grifin's Ex'r v. Cunninghami, (1870) 2o Grat. (Va.) 31; The
'ichmond2layoraly Case (187O),19 id.
673.
Such being the purpose of these
additional documents, their force may
readily be inferred and has not involved mauch contention. Thus, ini
Ridley v. Sherbrook (1866), 3 Coldw.
(Tenn.) 569, 575, the effect of a schedule, submitted and adopted by the
requisite ballots, was discussed. Lack
of time prevented more than an announcement of the decision, that "the
provisions of the Schedule, for all the
purposes for which they were designed,
(became part of the Constitution], and
had all the force of constitutional provisions." Hence the provisions of the
ninth section of the Schedule, authorizing the General Assembly, at its first
ensuing session, to fix the qualification
of voters, was valid and abrogated the
provisions of the previous Constitution
of 1834.
This Tennessee decision was followed
in State v. Johnson (1870), 26 Ark.
281, being the only one on the point,
accessible to the Supreme Court of
Arkansas.
Years before, the same result had
been reached in Pennsylvania in The
Co"nm. ex rel. v. Collins (839), 8
Watts. (Pa.) 3311, 335,348, and, also, in
1855, in Texas, supra p. 235.
It is true that an Ordinance appended
to the Constitution of Alabama, framed
in'1819, was denied to be such part of
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that instrument as only to be "abrogated and annulled in the same manner as
any other part :" GOLDTHWAITE, J.
Dukev. Cah,wba Aav. CO. (1846), IO
Ala. 82,88. The Ordinance provided,
among other things, that " all navigable
waters within this State shall forever remain public highways, free to the citizens of this State and of the United
States, without any tax, duty, impost,
or toll therefor, imposed by this State;
and this Ordinance is hereby declared
irrevocable, without the consent of the
United States." (i Poore's Const. 46.)
This Ordinance was merely the acknowledgment of this obligation, laid upon
the Convention by .6 of the enabling Act of March 2, 1819; 3 Stat.
at L. 492. The State, by Act of January io, 1827, incorporated the Navigation Company and authorized it to
charge and collect tolls: to this Act
Congress gave assent by their Act of
May 24, 1828; 4 Stat. at L. 3o8. The
Alabama Court very properly said, that
"The State Government being invested with the entire authority of the
people, except where they have chosen
to restrict the government, it follows
that all the external relations of the
people, with the citizens of other
States, or with the Government of the
United States, mult be conducted by
the State government. The Ordinance
itself indicates that it is revocable with
the consent of the United States, and
as the consent of the people of this
State can only be expressed through
the State government, it follows that
when the assent of both is given by
the constituted authorities of each, the
powers disclaimed, may be resumed
and immediately exercised l.y the
State authorities, under the general
powers, these not being restricted otherwise than by the Ordinance." (to Ala.
88-9.) All this is still true, and was
precisely the course taken during the reconstruction of the Southern States, the
VOL. XXXVIII.-I6.
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State Legislatures being required to
make certain alterations -in the proposed Constitutions before Congress
would approve them; see the cases of
Shorter v. Cobb, (i869), 39 Ga. 285,
303 -4 ; Hardemann v. Downer
(I869), id. 425, 443-4; Peak v. Swindle (1887), 68 Texas 242, 248; The
Slate v. Williams (1873), 49 Miss.
640, 66x ; Plowman v. Thornton,
(1875) 52 Ala., 559, 565.
A Schedule, or Ordinance, pro.osed
by a Constitutional Convention and
within the powers confided to such a
body, has now sufficiently appeared to
be of equal force with the provisions of
the amendment or new constitution itself, and, therefore, the question may
now be considered as to the time when
a-constitutional provision becomes the
supreme law.
As some of the cases to be cited,
arose from the reconstruction of the
Southern States, and a full discussion
of these cases would involve the powers
of Congress, much in the same manner,
as the principal case might equally
challenge those powers, it will not be
amiss to state briefly that there are
three theories of the time when the
transformation occurs from a Territory
of the United States into a State of and
in the Union. Beyond this, the discussion of the powers of Congress is unnecessary and wou!d distract from the
main question for this annotation: that
is, at what time is a constitntionalprovision the supreme law ?
The three theories were alluded to
in the opinion delivered in Secombe v.
Kitdelson (1882), 29 Minn. 555, 559,
as follows: Frst, that the adopted
Constitution of the new State cannot
take effect, and the new government
cannot go into operation, until Congress
admits the State into the Union. This
would leave the State still a Territory,
until admission. This theory has been
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exploded by the decisions upon the
reconstruction Constitutions of Virginia,
Mississippi and Texas, ifra.
Second, that the adoption of a State
Constitution, under the provisions of an
enabling Act of Congress, and the formation of a State government, create a
State, although not in the Union. This
theory seems to be the proper one and
to exclude any effo: t to organize a State
without permision of Congress : Shorter
v. Cobb (1869), 39 Ga. 285. 298, 299;
Hardemanv. Downer (1869), id. 425,
443Third, that compliance with any conditions required by Congress, (as the
ratification of the last amendment to the
Constitution .of the United States,) is
sufficient to complete the organization
of the State. This theory does not seem
to be law, under the Virginia, Texas
and Mississippi decisions, infra.
Coming now to the consideration of
the question as to when the constitutional provision becomes the supreme
law, and overrides previous constitutions and laws, the argument presented
for the respondent may be observed;
for it will appear to be a suitable introduction to the answer required to
sustain the Montana Court.
No doubt the contention in the principal case was based upon a sound
premise, considered by itself. That is,
if there had been no Ordinances of the
Convention and no provisions in the Act
of Congress autho-izing such Ordinances, the Constitution, when adopted,
would have required legislation to put
it into operation, and would seem to be
subject to the same rule of common
sense which perpetuates former legislation when a State adopts a new Constitution or amends an existing one.
That is, where legislation is necessary
to give effect to constitutional provisions
aid former legislation is not abrogated
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by the new provisions, such former legislation continues until new laws are
enacted: Cahoon's Case (1871), 20
Grat. (Va.) 733,789; (composition of
grand juries); Superr'isors v. Stoul
(1876), 9 W. Va. 703,705 (road juries).
Perhaps it might be safe to go further
and say that where legislation is not necsary for the operation of the new constitutional provisions, that a literal interpretation will not be adopted unless
absolutely required. This may be understood from the following case,
though the decision there finally turned
upon the necessity of legislation to enforce the plain prohibition.
The effect of the third section of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, came into
consideration before CHASE, C. J., in
Casaer. Griffin's Case, heard in the
United States Circuit Court for the
District of Virginia at May term, 1869,
and reported in Chase's Dec. 364-426.
The words of the Amendment are:
"3. No person shall be a Senator or
Representative in Congress, or elector
of President and Vice-President, or hold
any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who
having previously taken an oath, as a
memberof Congress, or as an officer of
the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive
or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United
States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same or
given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may, by a vote
of two-thirds of each house, remove
such disability. 5. The Congress shall
have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisiuns of this
article."
Under this section, Griffin prayed for
dischiarge, under a Habeas Corpbus, from
a conviction in a criminal court presided
over by a person who had, as a member
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of a State legislature, engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the United
States. The discharge was refused,
CHAsE, C. J., saying-" In the examination of questions of this sort, great
attention is properly paid to the argument from inconvenience. This argument it is true, cannot prevail over
plain words or clear reason. But, on
the other hand, a construction which
must necessarily occasion great public
and private mischief, must never be
preferred to a construction which will
occasion neither, or neither in so great
a degree, unless the terms of the instrument absolutely require such preference.
- * But, in all these [Southern]
States, all offices had been filled, before
the ratification of the Amendment, by
citizens who, at the time of the ratification, were actively in the performance
of their several duties. Very many, if
not a majority of these officers, had, in
one or another of the capacities described in the third section, taken an
oath to support the Constitution, and
had afterwards engaged in the late rebellion; and most, if not all of them
continued in the discharge of their
functions after the promulgation of the
amendment, not supposing that, by its
operation, their offices could be vacated
without some action of Congress. If
the construction now contended for be
given to the prohibitive section, the
effect must be to annul all official acts
performed by these officers." (pp. 417,
418.) And after alluding to the fifth
section, the Chief Justice proceeded,"Taking the third section then, in its
completeness with this [its] final clause,
it seems to put beyond reasonable question, the conclusion that the intention
of the people of the United States, in
adopting the Fourteenth Amendment,
was to create a disability, to be removed,
in proper cases, by a two-thirds vote,
and to be made operative in other cases,
by the legislation of Congress, in its
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ordinary course." (p. 422.)
So far as confirming the power of
such a de facto judge, the Chief Justice
announced (pp. 425-6) that he was
authorized to say that his action was in
accordance with the unanimous opinion
of the other Judges of the Supreme
Court of the United States, who had
examined into the case upon an application for a writ of prohibition against
the United States District Judge who
had ordered the discharge of Griffin
upon this Habeas Corpus. The case
came before the Chief Justice on an
appeal from the District Judge's order
of discharge.
The principle here upheld was before
the judges of the reconstructed States,
but was properly thought inapplicable
where legislation was not needed: see
especially the opinion in The State v.
Williams, (1873), 49 Miss. 640, 664.
682, where M1fusg-ove v. Leachman
(871), 45 id. 5sx, was distinguished.
When the Territory of Minnesota
passed into the State of that name, the
difference between the Territorial law
and the Constitution of the new State,
gave rise to the case of Parkerv. Smith
(1859), 3 Minn. 243. The defendant
was elected to be the District Attorney
of Dakota County, at the same, as the
electors voted for the proposed Coristitution of the new State, but his time of
residence had been insufficient under
the Territorial laws to become a candidate for office, though ample under the
Constitution then approved by the necessary ballots of the electors. The
Territorial laws were applied, the Court
saying, that "the Constitution was not
operative until after its adoption by the
people, and did not change any rights,
duties, requirements, or obligations that
were created by, or dependent upon
any Territorial act until it had received
such sanction." Not that the Court
took the Pennsylvania and New York
view of the adoption when the votes had
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been fully counted: l'nfra. page 247
A far less tenable theory was advanced:
"At the election in October, 1857, at
which the Constitution was submitted,
there were two distinct elections, although held on the same day and at
the same places, for convenience. This
was absolutely necessary in the event
of the Constitution being rejected by
the people, in which case all the votes
cast for any of the offizers created by
the Constitution, would have been of
no effect, and the whole State scheme
would have fallen to the grourd, and
the Territorial form of government
would have continued as if no such
election had taken place, and all the
officers, from Delegate to Congress to
those of precinct jurisdiction, elected
under the Territorial Laws, would have
entered upon their functions precisely
as they did the previous year." FLANDRAU, J., (id.) 243-4.
But this theory
overlooks the origin of the new officers,
such as members of Congress, as well
as those of the same function in Territory and in State, and was probably
based upon the language of the enabling
act of Congress (February 26, 1857, II
Stat. at Large 166) which differed from
the enabling act for Dakota, Montana
and Washington (February 22, 1889,
25 Stat. at Large 676), in authorizing
the Convention (Q 3) to determine
whether the people desired admission
as a State, and if so, authorized the
framing and submission ofa constitution,
and, also, (Q4) in the event said convention shall decide in favor of the
immediate admission of the proposed
State into the Union, providing for a
special census for the basis of the representation in Congress. In the Act of
1889, no State could come into existence without adopting its Constitution
(H 7 and 24) and the difficulties which
might arise from use of this theory, can
be ihferred from reflection upon the
case of Secombe v. XKiltelson (1882), 29

rel
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Minn. 555, where the Court dismissed
a discussion upon the power to amend
the State Constitution, not yet in force
according to this theory, by a rough
and ready and cemmon sense short cut,
that this amendment had afterwards
been amended out of the Constitution:
(id. 561.)
The weight of Stewart v. Crosby,
ante page 235, is much diminished by
the absence of any explanation of the
reasons upon which it is founded.
"The time remaining will not permit
an extended discussion of even the
material questions in the case, on which
its decision depends. But as a decision
at the present Term is earnestly desired by the parties, and may be important to the attainment of their rights,
we shall proceed to dispose of the case,
upon gsounds deemed clear and sufficient to determine the litigation between
the parties; and shall state only our
conclusions upon the material questions
involved in the decision; so.as to indicate distinctly the grounds of our judgment; reserving for a future occasion,
it may be for a future case, the statement at length of the reasons on which
we rest our conclusions:" WHEELER,
J- PP. 547-8.
Perhaps the disposition of the Texas
judges can be fathomed after consideration of a much later decision rendered
by their Supreme Court, in the case of
Peak v. Soindile (1887), 68 Texas 242,
which turned on the suspension of the
Statute of Limitations during the seecession period, by the reconstruction
Constitution. "The inquiry as to when
the Constitution, ratified by the people
in 1869, became operative, is now
directly presented; and if it be true
that it so became when ratified by the
people, it is clear that the instructions
given were correct and that the judgment, as to the appellee, must he
affirmed. * * * *

These acts, which

led to the formation of the Constitution,
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its adoption, and the admission of the
'State to representation in Congress,
not only evidence the opinion of Congress, that the Constitution took effect
before the State was admitted to representation, but also evidence the intention of the people, from whose will
alone a constitution could have an
existence, that it should be operative
prior to the time the State was admitted
When did the
* W
to representation.
people 'ordain and establish this Constitution' [Preamble] ? As their act,
and not the will of Congress, ordained
and established it, this must have been
accomplished when the will of the
people was manifested at the election
[to ratify or reject the proposed Constitution]. At no other time was expression of the will of the people, as to
whether or not the Constitution framed
by the Convention, should become the
Constitution of the State, ever given.
The Constitution fixed the terms of
-office for State officers, and declared
that these should run from the day of
general election; and the election dec.
laration, passed by the convention,
recognizing that fact, and intending to
leave no uncertainty as to the time
when the terms of all State, district
and county officers should commence,
declared that 'the said election, for
State, district and county officers,
should be conducted under the same
regulations as the election for ratification or rejection of the Constitution,
and by the same process. * * * * The
same declaration also fixed a time at
which the Legislature, elected under
the Constitution, should meet, as did
the Constitution fix the congressional,
senatorial and representative districts,
in which Congressmen, Senators and
Representatives were required to be,
and actually were, elected at the same
election at which the Constitution was
adopted. All these officers were elected,
and held under the Constitution, and

V.. KENNEY.

245

the members of the Legislature were,
by its terms, required, as a legislature,
to do acts [e. g., ratify the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States,] which
necessarily preceded the admission of
the State to representation in Congress.
(Act of Congress, April io, x869, 16
Stat. at Large 4t; Pas. Dig. art. 1136;
Constitution, art. 3, see. 36.) The
entire Constitution bears evidence that
it was the intention of the people that
it should become operative when
adopted by them, and there is nothing
in it to indicate an intention that any
part of it should be inoperative until
Congress admitted the State to representation. If such an intention was
evidenced, it should be given effect, for
it would be competent for the people
of a State, the sole Constitution making
power, to determine that a Constitution
should not be operative until the "happening of a future event, dependent
upon the action of some other body;
but, as no such intention is evidenced,
and as a valid State Constitution might
exist without reference to the will of
Congress, and although the State, by
that body, was denied representation,
we are of the opinion that the Constitution became operative, in all its parts,
from the time it was ratified by the
people. That Congress deemed the
condition of the country such, at the
time the Constitution was adopted, as
to require continuance, for a period
thereafter, of a provisional government,
and to deny to the State a representation in Congress, until it was satisfied
that the Constitution was in harmony
with that of the United States, and that
the time had come when the provisional
government should be withdrawn, is a
matter of no consequence in the consideration of the question before us:"
STAYTON,

A. J., pp. 247, 248, 249,

250.

These last words have reference to
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the seventh section of the Act of Congress : "That the proceedings in any of
the said States shall not be deemed
final, or operate as a complete restoration thereof, until their action, respectively, shall be approved by Congress."
The other States besides Texas were
Virginia and Mississippi, and decisions
there were made to the same effect:
State v. Williams (1873), 49 Miss.,
66z ; Zn re .Deckert (1874), opinion by
WAITE, C. J., sitting in U. S. Circuit Ct. E. Dist. Va., 1o Natl. Bank. R.
R., 1; S. C. 2 Hughes C. C. Rep. 187;
CamPbellv. Fields (1872), 35 Texas
752, all cited in the opinion just
quoted from. So also Fosterv. Daniels
(1869), 39 Ga. 39 decided with regard
to the enabling act of Congress of June
25, I868, and the President's proclamation of July 27, 1868, 15 Stat. at
L. 74, 708. And some years earlier
in Secombe v. .Kittelson (1882), 29
Minn., 555, this question was stated,
but not decided, the Court recognizing
the three theories of the time when a
Territory becomes a State, and citing
Camppbell v. Fields,supra, and Scott v.
.Detroit Young len's Society Lessee
(x843), I Doug. (Mich.) 119, which
followed the last of these theories.
An opposite view to that taken in
Texas was expressed in Alabama:
"Prior to the passage of that Act of
Congress [Act of June 25, 1868, 15
Stat. at Large 73, readmitting North
Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana,
Georgia, Alabama, and Florida], it had
been held by the officers in charge of
the election and its returns, that the
said Constitution had not been adopted
by the votes of the people of Alabama.
Hence, we affirm that said Constitution
became operative and obligatory in Alabama only on the twenty-fifth of June
1868;" STONE, J., Irwin v. The
MlfaYor (876), 57 Ala., 6, io. The
question has never been fully discussed
in that State, but always assumed to be
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answered as above : Plowman v.
T17ornto (1875), 52 Ala. 559, 567-8.
Several years previous, the Court of
Appeals, which is the next inferior
Court, had been called upon to decide
the time when an Amendment to the
Constitution of Texas took effect, so as
to render void a session of a County
Court, %yhereatthere had been a conviction for aggravated assault and
battery. The election for the adoption
of the proposed Amendments took
place August 7, 1883, and no special
provision having been made for the
counting of the votes, that duty by the
general law fell to the Secretary of the
State, on the fortieth day after the
election. The trial occurred September 8, 1883, during the forty days, and
was held valid. "It is unnecessary for
us, in this case, to decide whether, under the provisions" of Article 17 of the
Constitution, that the said amendment,
so receiving a majorityof the votes cast,
shallbecome a part of the Constitution,
and Proclamationshall be made by, the
Governor thereof---" an Amendment,
eo instanti, becomes operative, or
whether it derives its operative force
from the Governor's proclamation, declaring the fact of its adoption. We
are clearly of opinion, however, that
until after the expiration of forty days
from the election, under our general election laws, the amendments, until the returns are opened and counted
by the Secretary of State, can in no
manner be considered as operative, so
as to affect, modify, change or nullify
existing laws."
VHITE, P. J. Sewelv.
The State (1883), 15 Texas. App. 56,
6i.
In the same term the said Court was
called upon to decide whether a criminal trial, held after the votes on these
same Amendments had been counted,;
but before the'Governor's proclamation,
was sulject to these Amendments.
"Our con.truction of this provision is,
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that it is the ascertained majority of the
vote of the people, and not the proclamation of the Governor, which gives
force and effect to Amendment. If
the Governor were to neglect or refuse to
issue such proclamation, the amendment would, nevertheless, be a part of
the Constitution of the State, because it
it is the will of the people, expressed
in the mode prescribed by their organic
law. It certainly never was intended
that it should be within the power of
the Governor thus to defeat the solemnly declared will of the people. We are
of opinion, therefore, that as soon
as the election returns were canvassed,
and it was ascertained that a majority
of the votes cast were in favor of the
amendment, it became a part of the
Constitution and was in full force and
effect from that date :" Willson, J.
Wilson v. The State (1883), 15 Texas.
App. 150, 153.
This latter position of the Texas
Court quite agrees with The Comm. v.
Collins (1839) 8 Watts (Pa.) 331,
where the recent Amendments to the
Constitution of Pennsylvania were, according to the second section of the
accompanying Schedule, to"take effect
from the first day of January, 1839."
Upon the time when these Amendments
were adopted, not when they took
effect, depended the right of Judge
Oristus Collins to the office of President Judge of the Lancaster County
Court. Counsel for the defendant,
Collins, contended, among other things,
"that the bare ascertainment of the
vote of the electors, approving of the
Amendments proposed by the Convention cannot, with any color of propriety,
be regarded as the adoption of the
Amendments; that it could, at most,
only amount to a promulgation of the
vote given thereon; so that the citizens
throughout the State might become informed thereof before the first day of
January, 1839, whcn the Amendmems,
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according to the express declaration
contained in the second section of the
Schedule, were to take effect. *
*
that the general election in October,
1838, being the time when the people,
by their vote, approved of the Amendments, may very properly be regarded
as the time when they, by their vote
then given, agreed merely that the
Amendments should be received into,
and adopted as constituent parts of the
Constitution on the first day of January,
1839." (Per KENNEDY, J., id. 338).
But the Court denied these propositions, citing Owings v. Speed (1820) 5
Wheat. (i8 U, S.) 420, to the effect
that a constitution may be adopted
even anterior to the time of itscoming
into effect, and adding that" Under this
view, we have come to the conclusion
that the Convention, in using the expression - ' at the adoption of the
Amendments to the Constitution,'
could not have intended to refer to a
later point of time than the day when
the result of the vote of the electors
thereon was to be ascertained and
made known by the Speaker of the
Senate, from the official returns thereof.
And it may be that an earlier point of
time was intended; but according to
our construction of the Amendments,
as regards the main question before us,
it is not material whether an earlier
day was intended or not." (id. 341.)
HUSTOx, J., in the course of his dissenting opinion, said--" Neither the
Legislature, nor any branch of it, were
required to do any act, except count
the votes and certify the result; and
the Governor had no duty, nor power,
except to proclaim the result. The
sanction of neither Legislature nor
Governor was required, and whether
they approv, d, or disapproved of it,
did not affect its validi y. The people,
by their votes, approved, or adopted,
or ratified, or established it, and they
acted on the ninth of October, i'33.
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In a popular sense, they then adopted
it; but they adopted it as written, and
no otherwise. A Schedule was subjoined to it, and forms part of it; most
of its provisions are temporary, and
when once acted on become useless;
but they have the same force and obligation as the other parts of the instrument, and are derived from the same
source, viz.: the people." (8 Watts Pa.
348.) The dissent then proceeds to identify the time of the adoption of the
Amendments with the time fixed by the
Schedule, for their taking effect. A
similar conclusion, was reached, years
afterwards, in New York; see ihfra,
page 249 : ThePeoblev. Gardner(1871),
45 N. Y. 8Sz. As applied to the facts
of the principal case, these differences
amount to nothing, as they merely
serve to emphasize the power of a Schedule, or Ordinance, or special provision
to override pre-existing laws or constitutional provisions.
The Texas decisions are thus at one
but do not reach the extreme of the
principal case, whose correctness depends, like the Pennsylvaisia cases,
upon the power of the instrument
itself, including the Ordinance as pait
of the Constitution.
The opposite view had, long previous,
been expressed by BUCHANAN, J.,
dissenting from the opinion of the
Court in Sigur v. Crenshaw (1853), 8
La. An. 401, 426. The majority of
the Court held that a new constitution
superseded'a previous one, and did not
operate as an amendment, so as to continue existing laws. The dissenting
judge said--" I cannot concur to its full
extent, in the view taken by the relator, of the effect of the promulgation
of the new Constitution of Louisiana,
in the place of the old one, which was
abrogated; namely, that without some
saving clause, it would have dissolved
the whole frame of government, and
the obligation of laws previously en-
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acted. Such results belong to revolution the offspring of intestine commotion, or of foreign conquest, which
changes the allegiance of a nation, substituting monarchy or oligarchy, for
democracy, or vice versa,-or which
reduces an independent state into a
subject province. They have nothing
in common with the peaceful changes
so frequent in their occurrence, which
the combined republics of our political
confederation find it expedient from
time to time, to introduce into the details of administration of a government
alvays essentially the same, because it
always recognizes the same source
of authority-the people." These sentiments never attained to any further
judicial dignity: in Louisiana, the majority view was reaffirmed in The State
v. Dubuc (1854), 9 La. An. 237
More nearly resembling the principal case is that of The State ex rel.
-Hudd v. Timme (1882), 54 Wis. 318.

The relator sought by mandamus, to
have the Secretary of State audit his
salary as State Senator, under the provisions of certain Constitutional Amendments which did not specifically provide for the time of their operation.
The Court examined into the mischief,
and the remedy and then construed the
Amendments, saying (per Taylor, J.)" It would be absurd to hold that there
was any intention, on the part of either
the legislature or the people, to interrupt the. regular course of government
of the State by the adoption of these
amendments."
(p. 327.) And the
Court held, under such circumstances,
that the Amendments did not go into
effect until an election had been held
for senators and representatives, and
quashed the mandamus.
This decision was largely based upon
an opinion of the Justices of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1855,
in response to certain questions proposed by the Governor and Council of
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that State: reported, 3 Gray (Mass.)
6oi. An Amendment to the State
Constitution, adopted that year, con.tained no express repeal of pre-existing
provisions of the Constitution, and, to
come into practical operation, required
legislati-n, dividing the State into districts, before the members of the Councilcould be voted for. Consequently
the pre-existing provisions of the Constitut~on governed in the meantime:
id. 6o2, 604. But upon another point,
the opinion significantly proceeds:
"The fourth article provides for the
election of the secretary, treasurer,
auditor and attorney general. The
time for giving in of the votes for these
officers, the mode of declaring, certifying and returning the votes, are all
definitely provided for by the article
itself, so that no legislation is necessary
to give it effect. * " * But as this
Amendment of the Constitution, and
the elections made under it, cannot so
operate as to fill these offices, until the
third W,
rednesday of January next, we
are of opinion, that, up to that day,
appointments to these offices are to be
made, removals effected, and vacancies
filled, in the same manner as if this
Amendment of the Constitution had
not been made:" id. 604.
The Wisconsin Court also referred to
State v. Scott (I8 4 9 ), 9 Ark. 270 , where
the Court sustained the response to a
Quo Warranlo. An Amendment to
fie State Constitution provided that
"'The qualified voters of each judicial
circuit in this State, shall elect their
circuit judge." The Court he'd that
this did not vacate the offices of exi-ting circuit judges, but that they might
serve out their respective terms. "If
the Amendment will bear such a construction as to allow other provisions of
the Constitution to stand without doing
violence to any, it is then clearly permissible to-put such a construction upon
it. If the intention was to cLeate
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vacancies, is it not fair and reasonable
to suppose that words would have been
employed, directly and emphatically
declarative of that purpose, and that
no room would have been left for
doubt or construction ?"-JoHNSON, C.
J.,
p. 277. And WALKER, J.,equally
with the Chief Justice, planted himself
upon the rules laid down by Story,
Coin. on Const. H4oo, 405, 419.
ScoTT, J.,
dissented on the ground
"that the presumptions of law are a]wa'ys in favor of the immediate operation and effect of the organic law,
when applied to a convention of the
people assembled for the purpose of remodeling the entire State Government;
or, for the moment, doubt that the new
Constitution adopted by such convention, would be in force from the moment of its adoption, unless provision
should be made in the instrument itself
to postpone its operation and effect to a
future day. And I will take the ococcasion here, to zemark that, so far as
my research has extended, with all the
facilities afforded by the able and industrious counsel, I have found that it
has been the uniform course in all the
States of tis confederacy, not only
when the entire State Government has
been remodelled, but also in cases
where amendments to the Constitution
have been adopted, which, like this one,
withdraws sovereign powers, or which
necessarily disorganizes some part of
the exi-ting government, to adopt simultaneously with such Constitution, or
such new amendment, a schedule or
proviso, to sustain the old state of
things, and prevent po tem, the disrupting influence of the new Constitulion or amendment." id. 294.
Another reference of the Wisconsin
Court was to Statev. Ewinlg (185 3 ), 17
Mo. 515, which was a similar case to
to that before the Arkansas Court and
was similarly decided, the incumbent
being the Secretary of State.
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Still another reference was to The
People .v. Gardner (1871), 45 N. Y.
812, affirming s. C. 59 Barb. (N. Y.)
198. The Supreme Court was called
upon to construe a constitutional provision respecting the judiciary which
was to be in force " from and including
the first day of January, next after its
adoption by the people," in connection
with another provision affecting judges
"in office at the adoption of this article." Following an earlier decision
in Real v. The People (187o), 42 N.-Y.
270, the Court of Appeals distinguished
these two provisions through the use of
the words "by the people" in one of
them, so that where these words were
omitted, "the adoption of this article"
meant no more than "the time when
this article took effect," but where the
full phrase "adoption by the people"
was used, that meant an earlier day,
namely, when the votes had been completed. That is, constitutional provisions have force and effect as soon as
their own words indicate.
As this New York decision, in
respect to the time when the people
adopted, or expressed their will in
respect to the proposed constitutional
provision, appears to be similar to the
older Pennsylvania case (ante, page 247),
an extract from the opinion will be interesting in connection with the principal case. "The rule of the common
law is, that every law takes effect from
its passage, unless some other time is
therein prescribed for that purpose:
i Kent's Com. 458; Sedgwick's Stat.
6
and Const. Law, 82 [ ed. p. 6 ]." The
The result
opinion then proceeds:of the election, showing the adoption
of this article by a majority of the
votes cast, must, within the meaning of this rule, be deemed its passage. The canvass of the votes cast
by the various boards of canvassers, as
required by law, and announcing the
result, and certifying the same as requ:red by law, is as much a part of the

election as the casting of the votes by
the electors.
The election is not
deemed complete until the result is declared by the canvassers, as required by
law. When the result was declared
by the State board of canvassers, the
article was adopted, and under the rule
became operative at once, unless from
the nature of the provisions themselves,
or those of some other law, it appears
that it was to take effect at some future
period, or unless it clearly appears that
the intention of the framers of the article, and of those by whom it was
adopted, was, that it should not take effect until some definite future time:"
GROVER,J., Real v. The People (supra).
The attentive reader will already
have observed that the Courts have not
yet decided what is the earliest time
when a constitutional provision takes
effect. In the principal case, the enabling Act rendered a decision on this
point unnecessary: equally so in the
Texas case (page 245). In a subsequent case in Texas (page 246), and in
earlier ones in Pennsylvania and New
York (pages 247, *249-50), the time
was fixed as soon as the fact of a
majority of votes in favor of the constitutional provision had been ascertained,
upon a complete canvass of the votes.
The announcement of the result of the
election was not the earliest period of
time, because the officials might not
make the announcement. Whether the
counting of the votes in each precinct,
and before these results of the election
were officially aggregated, would be
held to be an instant when the constitutional provision had been adopted,
may be doubted, though any failure of
election officials to secure the completion of the counting of the votes might
urge the Court to fix so early a period
as election day itself (see page 247).
The sum of the matter is, that a constitutional provision takes effect from
the instant the will of the people has
JouN B. UHLE.
been ascertained.
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Supreme Court of Nebraska.
PULLMAN PALACE CAR CO. v. LOWE.
Sleeping-car companies, are liable to the same responsibilities and obligations as
innkeepers, in respect to passenger's goods. Such a rule is required for the security
of travelers and their protection against dishonesty, as well as negligence.

Error from District Court of Douglas County.
Howard B. Smitl, for plaintiff.
A. Steere, Jr., for defendant.
MAXWELL, J., Dec. 17, 1889. This action was brought by
the defendant in error against the plaintiff in error, to recover
the value of an overcoat, which, it is alleged, was lost or stolen
from a Pullman car in which the defendant in error was a
passenger, on the Wabash Railway, from St. Louis to Council
Bluffs. The Court was requested to make special findings in
the case, which it did, as follows:
"I find, as the facts proven on the trial of this case, that on the 18th day of
April, i88 7 , the plaintiff took passage at St. Louis for Council Bluffs on the
Wabash & St. Louis Railroad, and purchased a sleeping-car ticket from the
defendant's agency at St. Louis, entitling him to a lower berth in the sleeping-car
attached to the train which left St. Louis on the evening of that day. That the
train left St. Louis at 8:25 P. me. That a short time before the train left plaintiff
entered the sleeping-car, and, upon doing so, delivered his coat to the porter of
the car, who took it, and placed it in the vacant upper berth of the section of which
plaintiff had secured the lowerberth. That, shortly after the train started,the sleeping-car conductor passed through the car, and took up the ticket which had been purchased by the plaintiff, andgave him in exchange therefor another ticket, known as
a ' berth-ticket,' which was in turn taken up by the porter soon .afterwards, when
he prepared the sleeping berth for occupation by the plaintiff. That the next
morning, when the plaintiff arose, he took out from the upper berth a portion of
his clothing, and then saw his overcoat there, where it bad been placed the
evening before by the porter, and where he (the plaintiff) left it. That plaintiff
was last to leave his berth, and, with the exception of a gentleman and lady, the
the last of the passengers to leave the car for breakfast that morning. That
plaintiff went out to breakfast at the regular breakfast station, which occupied him
about fifteen minutes, and that after breakfast he stood on the rear platform of the
sleeper about ten minutes, smoking a cigar, and then went to his berth in the car,
the same having been made up, and then discovered that his overcoat was missing.
That he immediately called the attention of the conductor of the sleeping-car to
the fact, who, after first disclaiming any responsibility for the care of the coat,
after a time caused a search to be made through tl:e car, in company with the
porter, for it, but without finding it, and the coat has been entirely lost to the
plaintifl, and was of the value at the time of the loss of $5o. I also find that the
conductor left the car at the breakfast station, and went to his breakfast at the
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same time as the passengers, including the plaintiff, were at their breakfast, and
that during the interval of about twenty-five minutes' absence of plaintiff from his
berth in sleeping-car, between the time when he left the car for breakfast and
the time when he returned into it, his berth was made up, and his overcoat
abstracted.
"Conclusion of Law: I find, as a conclusion of law, that defendant was guilty
-of negligence in not properly guarding and taking care of property of plaintiff
during his necessary absence from defendant's car, and that plaintiff was not
guilty of negligence in the matter. I therefore find that defendant is liable to the
plaintiff for the value of the overcoat, to wit, $5o, with interest thereon from April
20, 1887, to the first day of this term, $3.75"

The rules of the company were also introduced in evidence
in its behalf, but, as the defendant in error had no notice of
them, they do not enter into the case.
The question presented, therefore, is the liability of a sleepingcar company for the loss of necessary wearing apparel of one
who had paid the necessary sleeping-car charges, and was
lawfully riding in one of its cars, which apparel had been
placed in the care of the employes of the company. We find
no case exactly in point, and as the question is a new one,
not only in this State, but, to a great extent, in the other
States of the nation, we are practically without precedents to
aid us, and must adopt such rule as may seem just and equitable. It may be well to consider what the company undertakes to perform, and also what it does not undertake. The
latter proposition will be considered first. It does not undertake to furnish the railway for its cars to run upon, nor the
motive power to propel them, and hence is not entitled to
compensation for the ordinary carriage of passengers. It does
invite for hire all passengers holding first-class tickets to
occupy its cars. In effect, it says to all such passengers:
"We will furnish you safe, pleasant, commodious cars, with
all possible facilities to prevent weariness and fatigue, with
comfortable sleeping accommodations, and the necessary toilet
facilities, if you pay the price demanded in addition to the
ordinary fare." The nature of this undertaking is the question
for consideration. On the one hand, it is claimed that, so far
as the company holds itself out as performing the duties of an
innkeeper, so far it should be charged with the strict liability
of the same. On the other, it is sought to make the liability
of the company merely that of a lodging-house keeper.
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In the very able and carefully prepared briefs of the attorney
for the plaintiff in error, we find the followifig objections to
charging the company with the liability of an innkeeper. He
says: It undertakes (i) to furnish accommodations to "firstclass" passengers exclusively; (2) to furnish toilet accommotions to such passengers; (3) to furnish a certain specified seat
or bed to such a passenger; (4) to furnish a servant who will
respond to all proper demands on his service by such passengers, promptly and politely; but to do these four things for a
limited time, which is agreed upon between it and each passenger in advance. -Itdoes not make even this agreement
with all those who travel by rail. It makes this agreement
with first-class passengers exclusively.
The distinction betiveen an innkeeper and a lodging-house
keeper is set forth in many cases, but is very well drawn in
the case of Cromwell v. Stephens (1867), 2 Daly (N. Y.) 15,
from pages 21 to 26, inclusive. After quoting the definition of
an "inn," as given by Chief Justice OAKLEY in Wintermute v.
Clark (I85I), 5 Sandf. (N. Y.) 247, to wit:
"Where all who come are received as guests, without any previous agreement
as to the duration of their stay or as to the terms of their entertainment."

And from Willard v. Reinardt (1853), 2 E. D. Smith (N. Y.)
148, in which the distinctions between a boarding-house and
an inn were declared to be this:
"In a boarding-house, the guest is under an express contract, at a certain rate,
for a certain period of time, but in an inn there is no express engagement; the
guest, being on his way, is entertained from day to day, according to his business,
upon an implied contract."

And from Carpenter v. Taylor (856),
as follows:

I Hilt. (N. Y.) 195,

"Mere eating-houses cannot be considered as inns.

They are wanting in some

of the requisites necessary to constitute them inns."

It will be seen that a distinction is attempted to be drawn
between the sleeping-car company and an inn-keeper, because
only a certain class can occupy such cars, viz., persons holding
first-class tickets, whereas, at an inn, all who conduct themselves properly may be entertained.
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There is great confusion in the decisions as to what constitutes an "inn." In Calye's Case (I584), 8 Coke, 32, it was
held that inns were instituted for passengers and wayfaring
men. In another case, an "inn" is defined to be a house
where the traveler is furnished all he has occasion for while
on the way: Thoiypson v. Lacy (1820), 3 Barn. & Ald. 283.
Bouvier defines "innkeeper" to be
"The keeper of a common inn for the lodgment and entertainment of iravelers
and passengers, their horses and attendants, for a reasonable compensation."

The innkeeper is bound to take in and receive all travelers
and wayfaring persons, and entertain them, if he can accommodate them, and the same is true of a sleeping-car company,
as to all passengers holding a first-class ticket. The fact that
persons holding second or third-class tickets agree, in effect,
in consideration of lower fare, to waive their right to enter a
sleeping-car, does not enter into the case, any more than that
a traveler who, to avoid the expense of an inn, should stop at
a private house. In any event, the company which sells
sleeping-car tickets to all first-class passengers that may pay
the price, to that extent stands in the same relation as an innkeeper who must for hire entertain those asking for entertainment.
A more difficult question is to properly define the word
"guest" at an hotel. Parsons defines a "guest" to be one
who comes without any bargain for time, remains without
one, and may go when he pleases: 2 Prs. Cont. 15 1. This
is not sufficiently comprehensive to be a proper definition.
In Walling v. Potter (1868), 33 Conn. 183, s. c. 9 AMERICAN
LAW REGISTER N. S. 618, the Supreme Court of Connecticut
defines the word "guest" as follows:
"A guest is one who patronizes an inn as such." But it is said that none but a
traveler can be a guest at an inn, in a legal sense. We do not suppose that the
court intended, in the definition above quoted, to lay stress upon the word ' traveler.'
It is used in a broad sense, to designate those who patronize inns. In Wintermute
v. Clark (1851), 5 Sandf. (N. Y.) 247, the Court say that, in order to charge a
party as an innkeeper, it is not necessary to prove that it was only for the reception of travelers that his house was kept open; it being sufficient to prove that all
who came were received as guests, without any previous agreement as to the time
or terms of their stay. A public house of entertainment, for all who choose to
visit it, is the true definition of an inn. These definitions are really in harmony with
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eac other. Webster defines a traveler as ' one who travels in any way.' Distance
is not material. A townsman or neighbor may be a traveler, and therefore a
guest at an inn, as well as he who comes from a distance, or from a foreign
country. If he resides at the inn, his relaticn to the innkeeper is that of a hoarder;
but if he resides away fi
om it, whether far or near, and comes to it for entertainment as a traveler, and receives it as such, paying the customary rates, we know
of no reason why he should not be subjected to all the duties of a guest, and.
entitled to all the rights and privileges of one. In short, any one away from home,
receiving accommodations at an inn as a traveler, is a guest, and entitled to hold
the innkeeper responsible as such."

This, we think, is a correct definition of the word "guest,"
and we adopt the same. Berkslire Woolen Co. v. Proctor(I85I),
7 Cush. (Mass.) 417: In the latter case, the guest made an
arrangement as to the price to be paid per week, and it was
held that this did not take away his character as a traveler
and guest. See, also, Hall v. Pike (1868), lOO Mass. 495;
Norcross v. Norcross (I865), 53 Me. 163; Pinkerton v. Woodward (1867), 33 Cal. 557; and a valuable article in 14 Cent.
Law J. 206; Hancock v. Rand (879), 17 Hun (N. Y.) 279In Dunbier v. Day (1882), 12 Neb. 597, this Court held that an
innkeeper was bound to take all possible care for the safety
and security of the goods, money, etc., of his guests while in
his house. And if the goods or money of a guest be stolen
from the inn, through no fault or neglect of the guest, nor by
a companion guest, and there is no evidence to show how
it was done, or by whom, the innkeeper is liable for the loss.
This, we think, is a correct statement of the law.
A "lodger"

is defined by Bouvier to be

"One who inhabits a portion of a house of which another has the general possession and custody.'

There is some confusion in the decisions, arising mainly
from the want of a clear definition of what constitutes a "guest"
as distinguished from a mere "lodger." Generally, however,
a lodger is one who, for the time being, has his home at his
lodging-place: Phillips v. Evans (1876), 64 Mo. 17. The rule,
under the decisions, is not of universal application, but nearly
so : Phillips v. Henson(I877), 30 Moak, Eng. R. 19; Thompson
v. Ward (871), L. R. 6 C. P. 327; Bradley v. Baylis (I88i),
L. R. 8 Q. B. Div. 195 ; Ness v. Stephenson (1882), L. R. 9 Q.
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B. Div. 245; Hickman v. Thomas (1849), I6 Ala. 666; Ullman
v. State (1876), I Tex. App. 220.
It will be seen that the engagement of the sleeping-car
company, so far as it goes, is exactly the same as the duties
assumed by an innkeeper, A passenger, on entering a sleepingcar as a guest,-because that is what he is in fact,-necessarily
must take his ordinary wearing apparel with him, and some
articles for convenience, comfort, or necessity. The articles,
when placed in the care of the company's employes, are infra
hospitium, and are at the company's risk.
The liability of innkeepers is imposed from considerations of public policy, as a means of protecting travelers
against the negligence and dishonest practices of the innkeeper
and his servants. Occasionally, no doubt, the innkeeper is
subjected to losses without any fault on his part. This, however, is one of the burdens pertaining to the business, and. the
courts have deemed it necessary to enforce this wholesome
rigor to insure the security of travelers. Besides, where loss
is sustained, neither party being in fault, it must be borne by
one of them, and it is no more unjust to place it on the innkeeper than on the guest. The liabilities incident to the
business are to be considered in fixing the charges for the
service: iliason v. Thomnpson (1830), 9 Pick. (Mass.) 283.
Except in the matter of furnishing meals, there seems to be
no essential difference between the accommodation at an inn
and those on a sleeping-car, except that the latter are necessarily on a smaller scale than at an inn. In both cases, the porter
meets the traveler at the door, and takes whatever portable
articles he may have with him. He waits upon him and the
other passengers in the car so long as they remain therein.
The traveler is not required to sit in his seat during the day,
but may, if he so desires, go forward into the other cars on
the train, and at stations may go out on the platform. A
passenger in a sleeping-car need not avail himself of these
privileges, but the fact that he may do so, and that many persons
actually do avail themselves of the same, is well known to
every traveler and to the company, and is a circumstance in
the case. If it is said that it would be unjust to hold the
company to the same liability as an innkeeper, because thieves
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might take one or more berths in a car, and at the first opportunity leave the car, carrying what articles they could steal
before leaving, the same is true of an innkeeper.' Thieves,
in the garb of respectable people, may take rooms at an
inn, and afterwards steal what they can, and escape, yet no
one would contend that the innkeeper would not be responsible for the property so stolen, and this, whether it is stolen at
night or in the day-time; yet in many of the large inns of this
country, at least, there are numerous doors for ingress and
egress, while in a sleeping-car there are but two. Were meals
served on a sleeping-car, no one would contend that it differed
from an inn in its accommodations. In this State, meals are
furnished on the through trains, and a passenger need not
leave the train from the time of entering it until he reaches the
end of the line. This, however, does not appear to have been
the case on the railway in question. But the fact that meals
are taken at designated stations on the line of the road, instead
of on the train itself, does not change the character of the
service rendered. So far as such services are rendered, they
are the same in kind as those furnished by an innkeeper; and
the security of travelers, and as a means of protecting them,
not only against the negligence but also against the dishonest
practices, of the agents or employes of the sleeping-car
company, requires that the company, so far as it renders
service as an innkeeper, shall be subject to like liabilities and
obligations.
The judgment is therefore affirmed.
concur.
The decision in the principal case,
by which a sleeping car company is
made liable, as an innkeeper, for the
goods of a traveler or passenger, stands
alone among the many authorities to be
found upon the question of the liability
of these companies, all the previous
cases having shown that sleeping cars
are not inns, nor their owners innkeepers.
Such being the case, it is proposed
in this annotation to show what an
VOL. XXXVIII.-17.

The other judges

inn is, and who is an innkeeper; the
differences that exist between the keeper
of a commpn inn and the owner of one.
of these companies; also, to consider
whether such companies can properly be
subjected to the stringent liabilities attaching to innkeepers, or whether they
are not to be considered jn the light of
ordinary bailees fur hire, and therefore
liable for ordinary negligence, in not
keeping a reasonable watch over the
passenger, and his personal belongings,
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while he is asleep; and further, to examine the question of liability of steaniboat owners as innkeepers.
An Inn, as defined by BAYLEY, J., in
Thompson v. Zary (1820), 3 Barn. &
"Ald.286, is a "house where the traveler is furnished with everything he has
occasion for while on his way," and by
BEST,J., in the same case, as, "a house,
the holder of which holds out that he
will receive all travelers and sojourners
who are willing to pay a price adequate
to the sort of accommodation provided,
ami who come in a situation in which
they are fit to be received."
In Wintemnete v. Clarke (1851),5
Sandf. (N. Y.) 247, OAKLEY, C. J.,
said it was "a public house of entertainment for all who chose to visit it,
which is the true definition of an inn."
Chancellor KENTinhis Commentaries
(7rol. II, p. 595), defines it thus : "It
must e a house kept open publicly for
the lodging and entertainment of travelem in general, for a reasonable compensation." "If a person," the same
Iearned writer goes on to say, "lets
lodgings only, and upon a previous
contract with every person who comes,
and does not afford entertainment for
the public at large indiscriminately, it is
not a common inn."
The various definitions are thus
treated by the Court in Bonner v.
Wlburn (1849), 7 Ga. 307: " The
leading ideas which pervade them all,
are, that inns are houses for the entertainment of all travelers. * * For
the entertainment of all travelers, at all
times and seasons, who may properly
apply, and behave with decency; and
that as guests for a brief period, and
not as lodgers or boarders, by contract,
by a season."
Mr. Justice STORY, in his work on
Bailments (Q475), thus defines an innkeeper: "The keeper of a common
inn for the lodging. and entertainment
of travelers and passengers, their horses

LOWE.

and attendants, for a reasonable compensation."
I In Kisten v. Hilderbrand(1848), 9
B. Mon. (Ky.) 72, Chief Justice MAIRSHALL defined an innkeeper as, "a
person who makes it his business to
entertain travelers and passengers, and
provide lodging and entertainment for
them, their horses and attendants" ; and
further; after stating that they are
liable as such although they have no
provision for horses; says: "It must
be his business to entertain travelers
and passengers." See to the same effect
Southtvood v. 17rers (1868),

3 Bush.

(Ky.) 681.
The case of Bonner v. Well urn,
(supra,) went so far as to hold that, a
hotel at a watering place, where there
was a medical spring, open during the
summer and fall for the accommodation
of visitors resorting thither for their
health or pleasure, was not an inn or
house of entertainment, but was in the
nature of a boarding-house.
From the above it is clear that, in
order to render a person liable as an
innkeeper, he must keep a common inn,
for the lodging and entertainment of the
public generally and indiscriminately;
and that, he must make such his business. This view is further supported
by Lyon v. Smith (1843), 1 Morris
(Iowa) X84, in which case MASON, C.

J.,
said: "To be subject to the same
responsibilities attaching to innkeepers,
a person must make tavern keeping, to
some extent, a regular business, ameans
of livelihood. He should hold himself
out to the world as an innkeepier. It
is not necessary that he should have a
sign, * * * provided he has in any
other manner authorized the general
understanding that his was a public
house, where strangers had a right to
require accommodation." And further,
by Carter v. Hobbs (1863), 12 Mich.,
56, where it is distinctly laid down that
the party must act in the capacity of an
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innkeeper, that the relationship of innkeeper and guest must exist; in short,
he must keep an inn. To the same
effect, Hioti v. Franklin (1858), 20
Tenn. 798 ; znga/sbee v. Wood (1862),
36 Barb. (N. Y.) 462; Wallingv. Pottr
(1868), 35 Conn. 183; s. C. 9 AmER.
LAW REGISTER 618. See also Carbnier v. Taylor (1856), i Hilt. (N. Y.)
193 ; where the Court held that, in order to charge a party as an "innkeeper,"
the premises must be kept as an inn for
the accommodation of travelers. The
opinion of the Court in Cromwell v. Stephens (1867), 2 Daly (N. Y.) 15,
further shows that, in order to render a
person liable as an innkeeper, meals
must be furnished. In this case DALY,
P. J.,
says: "A mere lodging house, in
which no provision is made for supplying lodgers with their meals, wants one
of the essential requisites of an inn."
The duties cast upon an innkeeper
are such, that, in pursuing his daily
business he is bound, not only to lodge,
but also, to feed his guest, and to receive
and care for his goods; and further,
unless otherwise provided by statute,
his liability is unrestricted in amount;
so he cannot select his guests, but is
bound to lodge and entertain all who
apply in a proper manner, in return for
which he has a lien upon the property
of the guest for his charges. Moreover,
an innkeeper is an insurer of the safety
of his guest's goods: .Mason v. Thompson (I83O), 9 Pick. (M ass.) 283 ; Berkshire Woolen Co. v. Proctor (1851), 7
Cush. (Mass.) 417; Duntbar v. Day
(1882), 52 Neb. 597; in which case it
was said that, it seems to be the fair
result of all the cases, that the innkeeper
is responsible for all the property of
every kind which the traveler finds it
convenient to have about him as a
traveler.
Now all these duties cannot fairly be

said to attach to a sleeping-car company,
and especially to such, as the one in

the principal case, where there was no
provision made to feed the passengers
on board, although if such provision
were made it might more reasonably be
urged that such companies were liable
as innkeepers. Yet in the opinion,,
MAXWELL, J., says, "Except in the
matter of furnishing meals, there seems
to be no essential difference between
the accommodation at an inn and those
on a sleeping car, except that the latter
are necessarily on a smaller scale than
at an inn." It is however manifest,
that there are very material differences
between the two, for a person occupying a berth in a sleeping car cannot
protect hiz per-on and goods by bolt
and lock from the thief; and these distinctions are perhaps nowhere better
shown, than by BROWN, J., in Blum v.
Southern Pullman Palace Car Co.
(1876), x Flipp. (U. S. Crt. Rp., V. D.
Tenn.) 500, wherein it was sought to
hold the defendants liable as innkeepers
for money stolen from out of the pas-,
senger's waistcoat pocket which he had
placed under his pillow on retiring for
the night. Holding the company not
liable as innkeepers the learned judge
said: "There are good reasons for not
extending such liability to the proprietors of a sleeping car. ist. The peculiar circumstances of sleeping cars are
such as to render it almost impossible
for the company, even with the most
careful watch, to protect the occupanta
of berths from being plundered by the
occupants of adjoining sections. All
the berths open upon a common aisle,
and are secured only by a curtain, behind which' a hand may be slipped
from an adjoining or lower berth with
scarcely a prosbibility of detection.
2d. As a compensation for his extraordinary liability, the innkeeper has a
lien upon the goods of his guests for
the price of their entertainment. I
know of no instance where the proprietor of a sleeping car has even asserted
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such lien, and it is presumed that none
ever exists. The fact that he is paid in
advance does not weaken the argument,
as innkeepers are also entitled to prepayment. 3d. The innkeeper is obliged
to receive every guest who applies for
entertainment. The sleeping car receives only first class passengers traveling upon that particular road, and it
has not yet been decided that it is
bound to receive them. 4 th. The innkeeper is bound to furnish food as well
as lodging, and to receive and care for
the goods of his guest, and unless otherwise provided by statute, his liability is
unrestricted in amount. The sleeping
car furnishes a bed only, and that too
usually for a single night. It furnishes
no food, and receives no luggage, in
the ordinary sense of the term. The
conveniences of the toilet are simply an
incident to the lodging. 5th. The conveniences of a public inn are an imperative necessity to the traveler, who must
otherwise depend upon private hospitality for his accommodation, notoriously
an uncertain reliance. The traveler
by rail is however under no obligation
to take a sleeping car. The railway
offers him an ordinary coach, and cares
for his goods and effects in a van especially provided for that purpose. 6th.
The innkeeper may exclude from his
house every one but his own servants
and guests. The sleeping car is obliged
to admit the employes of the train to
collect fares and control its movements.
7th. The sleeping car can not even protect its guests, for the conductor of the
train has a right to put them oft for nonpayment of fare, or violation of the rules
and regulations."
Again, the distinctions are further
shown in Welch v. The Pullman Palace Car Com1any (1874), i Sheld. (N.
Y.) 457, where the company was held
not liable as an innkeeper; SHELDEN,
J., said, "The liability of an innkeeper
arises out of facts which do not arise in

this case. He cannot lawfully refuse
to receive guests to the extent of his
reasonable accommodation, nor can he
impose unreasonable terms upon them.
The necessities of the traveler require
these just rules to be adopted. As a
compensation for the responsibility
thus incurred, he has a lien upon all
the property of the guest in the inn for
all his expenses there. * " Thedefendant could not be compelled to receive and entertain passengers, however
amenable it might be upon its contract
with the carrier, and it had no lien for
the price of the accommodations."
So in the case of Pullman Palace
Car Co. v. Smithr (I874), 73 Il1. 36o;
s. C. 15 A-MERICAN LAW R GISTER 95,
where it appeared that the company
had no place to store valuables, and
that their agents were instructed to receive no parcels, valuables or money,
and receive no pay for baggage or
valuables of any kind, but only to take
pay for the berths, and had a notice on
their ticket, placing all at the owner's
risk; on an action beingbroughtby the
passenger to recover a large sum of
money which had been stolen, while
he was asleep, from out of his inside
vest pocket, which he had placed under
his pillow previous to retiring for the
night, the Court held that the company was not liable as an innkeeper.
SHELDEN, J., in delivering the opinion
of the Court, (after citing various
authorities upon the nature of inns and
innkeepers) added," From the authorities already cited, it is manifest that
this Pullman Car falls quite short of
filling the character of a common inn,
and the Pullman Palace Car Company
that of an innkeeper. It does not, like
an innkeeper, undertake to accommodate the boarding public, indiscriminately, with lodging and entertainment.
It only undertakes to accommodate a
certain class, those who have already
paid their fare, and are provided with
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a first class ticket entitling them to ride
to a particular place. * * The not
furnishing entertainment is a lack of
one of the features of an inn. * .
The custody of the goods of the traveler is not, as in the case of an innkeeper, accessory to the principal contract to feed, lodge and accommodate
the guest for a suitable reward, because
no such contract is made. The same
necessity does not exist here as in the
case of a common inn. At the time
when this custom of an innkeeper's
liability bad origin, wherever the end
of the day's journey of the wayfaring
man brought him, there he was obliged
to stop for the night,and entrust his goods
and baggage into the custody of the
innkeeper.
But here the traveler
was not compelled to accept the additional comfort of a sleeping car; he
might have remained in the ordinary
car, and there were easy methods,
within his reach, by which both money
and baggage could be safely transported, and there was no necessity of
imposing this duty and liability on appellant [the company]. * * The
peculiar liability of the innkeeper is one
of great rigor, and should not be extended beyond its proper limits. We
are satisfied there is no precedent or
principle, for the imposition of such a
liability upon appellant."
These cases show, most lucidly, the
points of distinction between the two
classes of persons, and the principles,
therein set forth, pervade all the other
decisions upon the subject, except the
-one in the principal case. It does appear somewhat singular, that none of
the cases were either called to the attention of the Court, or cited by the
judge in his opinion. That such is the
case, however, one is led to presume
from the opinion, wherein MAXWELL,
j., says, " We find no case exactly in
point, and as the question is a new one,
not only in this State lut to a great. e%-

tent, in the other States of the nation,
we are practically without precedents
to aid us, and must adopt such rules as
may seem just and equitable."
There would seem however to be
ample authority to show that such is not
the case, and, that the weight of such
authority is decidedly in favor of holding them liable, as ordinary bailees for
hire (for negligence, in not exercising
ordinary care, and keeping proper
watch over the passenger and his personal belongings while he is asleep),
and not as innkeepers.
Against this theory, however, the remarks of SHELDEN, J., in Putllian
Palace Car Co. v. Smith, (supra,) may
perhaps be urged, inasmuch as, after
dealing with the question from the innkeeper's stand-point, as before shown, he
would seem to be of opinion that they
could not be held liable in any way, for
he says, "It would be unreasonable to
make the company responsible for the
loss of money which was never intrusted to its custody at all, of which it
had no information, and which the
owner had concealed upon his own person. The exposure to the hazard of
liability for losses by collusion, for pretended claims of loss where there
would be no means of disproof, would
make the responsibility claimed a fearful one. Appellee [the passenger], assumed the exclusive custody of his
money, adopted his own means for its
safekeeping, by himself, and, we think
his must be the responsibility of its
loss."
It does not seem just or right that
such companies should be held responsible for whatever amount persons,
knowing the situation in which they are
placed, may choose to carry about their
persons, whether for their own convenience or otherwise, without regard to
the reasonableness or unreasonableness
of the amount. Yet it is reasonable that
they should I-e held responsible for
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negligence in not keeping sufficient
watch, and exercising ordinary care in
guarding his person, and such property
as the passenger may reasonably carry
with him., This view the authorities
support.
The main object in providing such
cars is surely to permit the passenger to
sleep, thereby inducing him to depart
from the ordinary car, provided by the
railroad company, wherein if he sleeps,
he does so at his own risk, and to partake of the ease and comfort afforded
him by a berth in one of their own cars
where he is invited to sleep, and not
only to sleep but to disrobe in order
that he may make himself so far as possible as comfortable as he would be at
home. Thus, it cannot be said that,
while in this state, they expect him to
look after his own person and property.
They receive compensation for theprivilege of sleeping, and therefore
impliedly undertake to keep watch, and
use ordinary care in respect to his person and property.
This view is supported by the case of
Palmeler v. Wagner (1875), decided
in the Marine Court of New York, but
only reported in Ii Alb. L. J. 149 ,
where the Court held that, while such
companies were not insurers, innkeepers
nor transporters, yet they were bound to
use due diligence in keeping away disturbers, and must keep reasonable watch
to protect a passenger, and his property
about his person, during sleep.
Again, by Pullman Palace CarCo.v.
Gaylord (1884), 6 Ky. Repr. 279;
S. C. 23 AMERICAN LAW REGISTER

(N.

S.) 788, where the action was brought
to recover the value of a scarf-pin stolen
from a passenger in one of the company's cars, the company being held liable for a breach of duty in not keeping a
reasonable watch over the passenger
and his property, RICHARDS, J., remarked--" While * * * the stringent
liability of an innkeeper which the dis-

tinguished Chief Justice COLERIDGE
has said does not ' stand on mere reason,
but on custom, growing out of a state
of society no longer existing,' is not to
be applied to the owners of sleeping
cars, it does not follow that they assume no duties or liabilities. These
cars are in themselves an invitation to
the traveling public to enter and protect themselves against the weariness
of a long journey by disrobing and
sleeping. The passenger in buying and
the company in selling the ticket contemplate that this privilege will be improved. The company accepting compensation under these circumstances
impliedly undertakes to keep a reasonable watch over the passenger and his
property. The faithful performance of
this undertaking is the limit of its duty
in this respect. Its breach must be the
foundation of every action seeking to
charge the company with the loss of
articles the passenger has with him upon
the car."
The case of Les v. Arew York Ce,:tralSleeping Car Company (1887), 143
Mass. 267; S. C. 26 AMERICAN LAW
REGISTER (N. S.)

359, further .illus-

trates the above principles. In that
case, there were two actions, one in
contract alleging that the company, in
consideration of the purchase of the
ticket entitling the passenger to be carried in a sleeping car, undertook to
provide him with a berth in such car,
and to see that such car was properly
guarded, and that his personal baggage
and effects were protected while he was
asleep, but that'through the negligence
of their agents certain monies were
stolen. The other action was in tort,
and alleged the same, and claimed
damages. In delivering the opinion of
the Court, which held the company
liable as for a breach of duty, that is,
for negligence, MORTON, C. J., said,
"A sleeping car company hols itself
out to the world as furnishing safe and
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comfortable cars; and when it sells a
ticket it impliedly stipulates to do so.
It invites passengers to pay for, and make
use of, its cars for sleeping; all parties
knowing that, during the greater part
of the night, the passenger will be
asleep, powerless to protect himself, or
to guard his property. He cannot, like
the guest of an inn, by locking the door,
guard against danger. He has no right
to take any other step to protect himself
in a sleeping car, but, by the necessity of
the case, is dependent upon the owners
and officers of the car, to guard him
and the property he has with him from
danger from thieves or otherwise. The
law implies the duty on the part of the
car company to afford him this protection. While it is not liable as a common carrier or an innholder, yet it is
its clear duty to use reasonable care to
guard the passengers from theft; and
if through want of such care, the personal effects of b.passenger, such as he
might reasonably carry with him, are
stolen, the company is liable for it.
Such a rule is required bypublic policy
and by the true interests of both the
passenger and the company; and the
decided weight of authority supports
it."

The case of Pullman Car Conz~pany
v. Gardner (i88 3 ), 3 Penny. (Pa.) 78,
while conceding that the company was
not liable as an innkeeper, clearly shows
that "a reasonable and proper degree
of care is imposed on the company,"
for the Court said, "The main object in
taking passage in such a car is to permit the passenger to sleep." The Court
almost made it an imperative duty for
such companies to keep a watchman in
the car, saying, "Unless a watchman be
kept constantly in view of the centre
aisle of the car, larceny from a sleeping
passenger may be committed without
the thief being detected in the act."
The case of .Dargan v. Pullman
Palace Car Co. (ISS5), 2 Willson

(Texas Ct. App. Civil Cas., 67,ft kes
the law as well settled ithat sleeping car companies are notte ,beregarded as innkeepers, nor subjected to their
onerous liabilities in respeot of the
property of those enjoying their accommodation, and holds that, it is their
duty to exercise ordinary care for the
security of passengers' valuables," and.
that a failure to use ordinary care.,
proportionate to the danger reasonably
to be apprehended, would be negligence
which would reasonably render sucha
company liable for the loss ofthepassenger's property (per WILLSONJ.). Pointing out that greater danger exists at
night, while the passenger is asleep,
than in the day time, when he is awake
and can care for himself, the Court
dwells upon the invitation to sleep, and
the implied agreement to take reasonable care of the guest's effects while
he is asleep.
Again, in Root v. Ve-w York Centra2
SleePing Car Co. (1887), 28 Mo.
App. 199, THOMPSON, J., says, "The
settled law is, that a sleeping car company is not an insurer of the baggage
of a passenger, but that its liability, at
most, is that of a bailee for hire. In
the case of a loss of the passenger's
baggage or belongings, it is therefore,
liable, if at all, only on the ground or
negligence, and in order to be so
liable, it must have been negligent in
the performance of some duty which it
assumed to perform for the passenger.
That' duty, so far as adjudged cases
seem to have gone, is, that it will maintain in the car reasonable watch during
the night, while the passenger is
asleep." He even goes further than
this and says, "that the duty of keep.ing watch does not terminate with the
period during which the passenger
is actually asleep, but that it extends to
keeping a reasonable watch over such
of the necessary baggage and belongings as he cannot conveniently take
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with him nor watch himself while he
is absent from his berth in the washroom, preparing his toilet after arising
in the morning." And further, that
such dutyextended to "the extent of
baggage reasonably necessary."
See
to the same effect Wilsonz v. Baltimore
& Ohio Ry. Co. (i888), 32 Mo. App.
682.
The case of Scalbig v. Pullman
Palace Car Co. (1886), 24 Mo. App.
29, further supports this view, LEwis,
P. J., saying," The gist of the action is
negligence. * * * Sleeping car
companies are not liable to the responsibilities of common carriers, or of innkeepers. But there is a peculiar *esponsibility implied in every contract
of the company with a passenger."
Bevis v. Ballimore & Ohio Ry,. Co.
(1887), 26 Mo. App. i9, in which the
Court said, "there must be reasonable
care in keeping watch while the plaintiff slept," further supports these
views.
In Woodruff Sleeping Car and Parlor Coach Co. v. Diehl (1882), 84 Ind.
474, the Court held that the company
was not liable either as an innkeeper,
or as a common carrier, but was liable
for negligence, Howsc, J., saying,
"While it maybe true that a sleeping
car company is not liable as an innkeeper or a common carrier, yet it cannot be held that the company is not responsible to an occupant of a berth in
its car for the loss of his personal
goods and money, resulting from such
negligence, as was shown by the facts
in this case." And further, after quoting the language used in Crozier v.
Boston etc., Steamboat Co. (infra), as
follows: "In such a case, the passenger is invited, upon the payment of aconsideration, to disrobe himself and
retire to a couch to sleep; in other
words, he is invited to throw aside all
the vigilance and precaution which
men habitually practice when awake,

and to entrust his person and whatever
men usually carry about their persons,
to the care and vigilance which, it
must be presumed, they who extend
the invitation and receive the reward
for the comfort thus afforded, will
themselves exercise.
Certainly few
persons would dare trust themselves to
sleep in a state-room on board a
steamboat unless they supposed those in
charge of it were under an obligation
to exercise the utmost vigilance," added, "this language it seems to us, is as
applicable to the occupant of a berth in a
sleepingcar as to the occupant of a stateroom on a steamboat."
The case of Pfaelzer v. The Pullman
Palace Car CO. (1877), 4 W. N. C.
(Pa.) 240, further shows that the gist of
the action is negligence, and although
the company was not in this instance
sought to be made liable as an innkeeper, hut as a common carrier, it is
here cited to support the contention
that they can only be made liable as
ordinary bailees for hire. In this case
the plaintiff had two valises, which on
entering the car were taken from him
by the porter; plaintiff left the car for
a few moments, and onreturning found
one was missing. He sued the company as common carrier, but the Court
held it was not liable as such, and
that in order to recover, negligence
must be shown. To the same effect,
Whitney v. Pullman Palace Car Co.
(1887), 143 Mass. 243. The case of
Puflltna Palace Car Co. v. Pollock
(1887), 69 Tex. 120, further supports
the contention, that they are not liable
as common innkeepers, the Court saying,
"It is evidently true it [the company]
did not assume * * * the liabilities
which the innkeeper assumes to guests."
The recent case of Pullman Palace
Car Co. v. Afatthcws, decided in the
Supreme Court of Texas, November 1,
1889, further supports the cases of Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Pollock and
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Lewis v. A'ew York Central Sleeping
Car Co., supra.
So far, the cases, to which attention
has been drawn, have related solely to
actions brought against sleeping car
companies strictly so called, but inasmuch as the question, whether or not
the liability of an innkeeper attaches to
the owner of a steamboat, is so closely
connected with tbhe subject that an examination of the cases upon this side of
the question seems necessary.
There would seem to be more reason
for holding the owner of a steamboat to
the responsibilities of an innkeeper than
in holding a sleeping-car company,
purely so called, thereto. In a steamboat, a person occupying a state-room,
has the means of protecting himself by
lock and bolt against the thief; and a
cloak room is provided; he is also furnished with meat and drink upon the
premises, in the same manner as at an
inn. Yet here, the courts have differed
in their opinions.
In the case of Steamboat Crystal
Palaee v. fVanderpool (1855), 16 B.
Mon. (Ky.) 302, a case in which a theft
had been committed, of articles from
the passenger's state-room in the night,
., says, "Steamboats are,
CRENSHAW,
in some respects, analogous to inns, and
it would greatly promote the ease, comfort, and safety of the traveling community if their owners were held responsible to the same extent that innkeepers are; but, so far as we know,
they have never been held accountable
upon the principles applied to innkeepers." He regarded them however
as common carriers and held them not
liable, as the articles were not entrusted
to their safe keeping.
In Mlacklin v. Nea Jersey Steamboat
Co. (1869), 7 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 229; S.
c. 9 AMERIcAN LAW REGISTER 239,
which was also a case of theft, DAILY,
J, applied the law upon the question of
the liat ility of innkeepers to the case of

a steamboat, "in which the traveler is
carried, lodgedand fed," andmay "with
some liberty of speech, be called a
traveling inn." Here again the Court
found the defendants liable as common
cairiers of passengers.
Crozier v. 7he Boslon, Ae-w York
and Alew-port Steamboat Co. (187), 43
How. Pr., (N. Y.) 466, was also a case
of larceny of articles from the plaintifi's stateroom in the night, although
he had taken the precaution to lock the
In this case
door before retiring.
CARTER, J. C., as referee says, " I
perceive in it all the elements of that
form of liability which, under the circumstances analogous, attaches to an
innkeeper. The rule of law applicable
to such a case, I think to be this,-that if any of the articles or money
which the passenger properly has with
him in the state-room are stolen, the
presumption is, that the theft was in
consequence of the default of the carrier and that this presumption can be
rebutted only by proof that the loss
was attributable to the negligence or
fraud of the passenger, or to the act of
God, or of the public enemy. All the
considerations of public policy, which
have operated to fix upon innkeepers the rigorous liability above indicated, apply, as it seems to me, with
increased force to the case of carriers
of passengers under these circnmstances."
Thus the cases above cited apply the
strict rules of law relative to innkeepers, to the owners of steamboats, while,
in the following the contrary opinion is
held.
In Clark v. Burns (1875), 118
Mass. 275, defendants were sued, for
the value of a watch stolen from
plaintift's state-room, as common carriers, with counts charging them with
negligence and charging them as innHere GRAY, C. J., said:
keepers.
"The liability of an innkeeper extends
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only to goods put in his house as keeper
of a public house, and does not attach
to a carrier who has no house, and is
engaged only in the business of transThe defendants carrying
portation.
passengers and goods for hire, were
not innkeepers." He further held that
in order to enable plaintiff to recover,
negligence must be proved.
The view taken in this case is supported by the case of American Steamboat Co. v. Bryan (1887), 3 W. N. C.
(Pa.) 528, where it was held that they
could not be held as innkeepers; negligence must be proved.
These last two cases are supported by
the opinion of RICHARDS, J., in Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Gaylord
(suipra),wherein, in speaking of a sleeping car, he says: "It could no more
be said that a sleeping car was an ' inn
on wheels' than that a steamboat was
an ' inn on water.'"
The fact, that such personal belongings of the traveler as he may reasonably carry with him are lostin, or stolen
from, a sleeping car, does not relieve
the railroad company from responsibility
This was decided by the
therefor.
case of Kiusley v. Lake Shore and
.ilchgan Southern R. R. Co. (1878),
125 Mass. 54, where the plaintiff, a
traveler on the defendant's road, occupied a berth in a sleeping car owned
by another company. On stopping at a
depot for the purpose of taking dinner,
plaintiff asked an employe whether his
baggage would be safe if left in such
car, and on being informed that it
would, left it, and went to dinner. On
his return he found the car had been
taken off the train, and was told be
would find his baggage in another car
on the train. Boarding such car, he
found some portion missing, and brought
an action against the railroad company.
In the opinion of the Court, GRAY, C.
J., says : "The fact that the car was not

owned by the defendant, but was used
on its road under a contract with other
parties who furnish conductors and servants to take charge of such car, there
being no evidence that the plaintiff
knew of that contract, or had any notice that the car was not owned by the
defendant and under its exclusive control, could not affect the measure of
the defendant's liability to the plaintiff." The same result was reached in
the case of Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy
(s88o), 102 U. S. 452, where personal
injuries were received by the plaintiff,
riding in a sleeping car, through the
falling of a berth. Holding the railroad
company liable, HARLAN, J., remarks,
"The law will not permit a railroad
company, engaged in the business of
carrying people for hire, through any
device or arrangement with a sleeping
car company whose cars are used by,
and constitute a part of the train of the
railroad, to throw off the duty of providing proper means for the safe conveyance of those whom it has agreed
See to the same effect,
to carry."
Louisville, Nashville 6- Great Southern R. R. Co. v. Kalzenberger(1886),
16 Tern. 380.
Reference may here be made to
the annotation to the cases of Wallingv.
Potter (1868), 9AMER. LAW REG. 618 ;
Pullman Palace Car v. Smith (1874),
15 Id. 95; and Lewis v. New York
CentralSleeping Car Co. (1887), 26 Id.
359, as further supporting the view here
taken.
This annotation has, as far as possible, been confined to the question of
holding sleeping car companies liable
as innkeepers, and has not touched, or
if so, very slightly, upon the question
of their liability as common carriers of
passengers, inasmuch as that question
did not arise, nor was it even mooted
in the principal case.
ERNEST WATTS.

